Hello Friends,
There are many questions about the causes for the explosion of Radical Islam not only in the world at large but within the confines of the Islamic world itself. Over the centuries since the birth of Islam there have been many factions and sects within Islam that preached different versions and interpretations of what is the true Islam.
There have been factions that sought enlightenment and basic freedoms that would allow Islam to inter mesh with other religions, beliefs and cultures to the insulated versions that are against any form of freedoms that stray from their understanding of Islam and the Koran.
As you'll read in the article below the liberal and rational factions always inevitably lost and the radical factions won aside from short periods in history where the moderates had the upper hand.
The radical factions also brought about forms of government that were autocratic and despotic and the radicalization of Islam was a product of these societies.
Shalom,
Peter
About the author. Tarek Heggy is both a leading liberal political thinker in the Arabworld and International Petroleum Strategist. His work advances thecauses of modernity, democracy, tolerance, and women's rights in theMiddle East – advocating them as universal values essential to theregion's progress. Professionally, Tarek Heggy is a world-known expertin Natural Gas and has written about the Middle East 's Natural Gasplans in relation to its political and economic future. As one of thecontemporary leading Arab liberal theoreticians, Tarek Heggylectured/spoke at a wide number of universities and research centers:London, Oxford, Rotterdam, Tokyo, Princeton, Columbia , Maryland,California Berkeley universities, Colorado School of Mines, theHeritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Nixon Center, TheWashington Institute for Near East Policy, the National Endowment forDemocracy, the Carnegie Endowment ,the American Enterprise Institute,the RAND, the Foundation of Defense of Democracy, the Council onForeign Relations (NY), the Center for National Security and many otheruniversities and research centers.
November 23, 2009 7:00 AM
by Tarek Heggy
The Proliferation of the Radical Jinni
The Fuel of Intolerant IslamManyhave attributed the spread of religious extremism today in countrieslike Egypt, for example, to external factors, such as foreignincitement and foreign financing of extremist movements in general, andof fundamentalist Islamic groups in particular. This attribution isextremely dangerous: by presenting the issue of religious extremism asa security problem - to be dealt with by the police and other securitybodies – it removes it from the realm of problems amenable to politicalsolutions.
Those who are quick to point an accusing finger atexternal forces should realize that if Egypt had been a haven of socialtolerance, brotherhood and peace, it would not have been susceptible tointerference from abroad. This means that other local factors havecreated a favorable climate for such attempts to succeed.
Political OppressionOver the last fewdecades, many societies in Islamic countries were subjected to varioustypes of despotic rulers, governing their countries with an iron fistin a setting of widespread autocracy. The most dangerous of the manynegative effects of political oppression is the impediment of socialmobility: it impairs the opportunity for the most qualified citizens torise to leading positions in various fields.
The disappearanceof a healthy process of social mobility makes for a static situation inwhich inept and mediocre persons come to occupy top positions by dintof accepting, indeed, of supporting, oppression through unquestioningloyalty to their superiors. This occasions a downward spiral that Icall “the equation of destruction”: Oppression and autocracy producefollowers, not competent people. Lack of social mobility destroyscompetence across the board at all societal levels. Lack of competence,in turn, results in the collapse of all institutions and in widespreadmediocrity which then becomes the norm. This engenders a powerfulsubversive energy of despair and rage, which breeds the mentality ofviolence. That mentality devalues the worth of human life, whether ofone’s self or of others, as well as spreading a desire for revenge.This acquired “mentality of violence” has come to permeate many ofthese societies.
By the same token, oppressors prevent the growth of civil society, widen incompetence and divide political life into two levels:
- a level above ground (which belongs exclusively to the rulers and their cohorts)
- alevel below ground (which belongs to symbols of Wahhabi, Qutbi, orother such versions of Islam, who receive the best possible training inthe art of growing underground in secrecy).
In the absence of civil society, with the lack of social mobility andthe prevalence of incompetence, the stage is set for a new group ofoppressors who are at the same time themselves incompetent.
Nosooner are there changes causing the downfall and removal of thedespotic ruler in these societies (Suharto in Indonesia, Saddam Husseinin Iraq), than there emerge on the scene representatives of thefanatical interpretation of Islam by the only political force whichexisted underground, and who now put themselves forward as saviors.However, they will only succeed in leading their societies to greaterdepths of backwardness, distancing them still farther from the modernage and sinking them even deeper into social problems. Some people arefooled into thinking that these fanatic representatives are the onlypolitical power produced by those societies, when in fact this state ofaffairs is produced by the despotic rulers and their autocratic regimeswho kill social mobility.
Both sets of oppressors, thoseoperating above ground and those belonging to clandestine undergroundorganizations, are products of this equation. A valid question is: Whyis this the only model that emerges whenever an oppressive regime fallsin a Muslim or Arab country? The answer is simply that this is anatural result of the widespread despair felt by those living under anautocratic regime that allows no political activities above ground.Hence, the only organizations that can survive in its shadow are thoseoperating underground.
The cure must start with the first link in the chain, not with thelast. The educational and media institutions are incapable ofredressing this disaster: they too have been corrupted at the hands ofincompetent leadership.
Wahhabism and Tribal ValuesWhen I wasstudying towards a degree in comparative law, I acquired a knowledge ofthe principles of Islamic jurisprudence. My readings took me beyond thecircle of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence to those of theShi’ites and the four main doctrines of the Khawarij, as well as toother schools, such as the eponymous Al-Tabari and Al-Laith and manyother interpretations. [Other worlds closely linked to the field ofIslamic jurisprudence, the most important being the doctrine of theMutakallimun (dialectical theologians), and delving deeply into thephilosophical teachings of the Mu’tazalites and the Ash’arites. Therewas also the world of the Bateneyites in the history of Islam, to whichI was introduced by a close friend, Dr. Mahmoud Ismail, whose writingson the thinking of the Khawarij, the Qarametta and of what he calls theother “secret sects” of Islam (radical fringe movements that neverbecame part of mainstream Islam), served as one of my primary sourceswhile studying the history of Islamic jurisprudence.]
In short,we are dealing here not just with one single model of Islam but with amultitude of interpretations by different schools. Islamic texts areamenable to many interpretations. Some of the earliest converts toIslam admitted as much some one thousand four hundred years ago whenthey said “The Qur’an displays many faces.” Again, what counts is notthe scripture or text but the person who reads, understands andpresents it.
The practice of relying on one text while ignoringanother is a destructive process that lends itself to abuse. As astudent of the Torah and the Talmud, particularly the BabylonianTalmud, known as the Gemara, I do not allow myself to take at facevalue the words spoken by Joshua, son of Nun, on a certain occasion ina given context. By the same token, I cannot accept that “
saddaq”(dowry) is an article of Jewish faith just because King Saul demandedit from David, son of Jesse of Bethlehem (King David for the Jews, theProphet David for the Muslims) for the hand of his daughter Michal. Icannot go around brandishing this text as a divine revelation outsideits historical, human and chronological framework.
For example, the sources of jurisprudence and the number of the Prophet’s “
Hadiths”regarded as sources of religious doctrine and practice vary widely fromone school to another. The great jurist Abu Hanifah accepted just overa hundred as apostolic precept, while the conservative theologian AhmedIbn-Hanbal accepted over ten thousand in his book
Al-Musnad.Thus, the Hanafites rely on istihsan (literally preference, which meansusing few traditions and extracting from the Qur’an the rulings whichfit their ideas) while the Malikites rely on istislah (publicadvantage). Then we have those who insist on a dogmatic interpretationof holy texts and others who, like Ibn Rushd, eschewed narrowinterpretation in favor of deductive reasoning (al ta’weel).
Evenwhen it comes to the consumption of alcoholic drinks, we have differentopinions. Whereas most jurists interpret the text addressing thesubject as banning drinking altogether, others like Abu Hanifah believethe ban applies only to intoxication. He makes his views on the subjectclear in the following passage:
"If it gets me thrown into Hell I will not drink it,
“But even if I am thrown into Hell I will not call it sinful."
The Roots of Wahhabism Having different trends, creedsand schools of thought, Islam has had its share of fanatical hardlinersthrough the ages, from its inception to the present. As early as thefirst century of the Muslim calendar, Islam has known radical sects whodemanded blind adherence to their rigid reading of the articles offaith, side by side with mainstream Islam, whose adherents forgoviolence and extremism and do not profess to hold a monopoly on Truth.The phenomenon began with the emergence of Al-Khawarij (the Seceders)in 660 AD, the middle of the first
Hijra century (their mostimportant doctrine is the Abadeya School, still prevalent in a smallregion of Algeria and in most of the Sultanate of Oman). This sectpreached a dogmatic interpretation of Scripture, and practiced aversion of excommunication by branding those who did not adopt itsteachings as heretics. This was the first such sect, but by no meansthe last. Throughout the history of Islam the quiet rhythm of religiouslife was disrupted many times by marginal groups who tried to imposetheir extremist views on the majority by violent means.
Amongthe earliest was Hamdan Ibn Qarmat, who carried away the Black Stone ofthe Ka’bah, and the latest is the man now hiding in the caves ofWazirstan, Osama bin Laden. In between these two, was Sayed Qutb, whocame up with a theory that will continue to be a wall separatingMuslims from the rest of humanity and from any hope of progress untilthe wall is torn down. Known as the “theory of divine dominion,” Qutb’stheory postulates that mortals are not ruled by mortals but by God. Andwho, you might ask, will make God’s wishes known to humans? The answeris, of course, “we, the ‘
ulemas”! [Religious scholars.] It isa theory that holds Muslims hostage to a theocracy overtaken by themarch of human progress and places them at the mercy of a powerstructure dominated by a caste of clerics -- even though in most Muslimdoctrines there is no such thing as a clergy in Islam and nointermediaries between Man and God.
As to the notion of men ofreligion passing themselves off as men of wide learning, which is theEnglish translation of the word ‘
ulema, a recent incidentillustrates just how limited their fund of knowledge really is. In thecourse of a debate which took place recently, someone asked one ofthese ‘ulemas, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,whether he knew who Bill Gates was. His reply: “I don’t, and it is notimportant to know!” This reply also shows how insular and isolated fromthe realities of modern life these self-appointed authorities truly are.
Alongsidethe groups and sects whose members insist on a literal interpretationof holy texts and laid down strict rules governing all aspects of life,there is the general trend represented in the main Sunni schools, [themost important of these are the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafici and Hanbali,and their offshoots, Al-Laith and Al-Tabari] as well as the Shi’ites,who are split into a number of sects.
The most importantShi’ite sect is the Imamiyah, or Ithna’ashariyya, (i.e. Twelvers), socalled because they accept as imams twelve of the descendants of AliIbn-Abi Talib. (According to their belief, the twelfth imam, whodisappeared about 874 AD, is still living and will return).
Itis within this general trend that prominent proponents of deductivereasoning emerged, like the great jurist Abu Hanifah, as well asuncompromising champions of tradition, like Ahmed Ibn-Hanbal. Theconservative Ibn-Hanbal served as the bulwark of orthodoxy andtradition against any intellectual endeavor and for a time exerted aconsiderable hold on public imagination. His influence eventuallywaned, but prior to the decline that preceded recent resurrection in1744 AD, in his heyday tradition reigned supreme and very little roomwas left for reason. The two main disciples of Ibn-Hanbal wereIbn-Taymiyah and Ibn-Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya, who, like their mentor, allowedno scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmaticadherence to the
Hadiths as authoritative sources of allmatters spiritual and temporal, laying down strict guidelines to governevery aspect of daily life. In addition, the world of Islam was thescene of a battle of ideas between Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (Algazel), astrict traditionalist who did not believe the human mind capable ofgrasping the truth as ordained by God, and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), whochampioned the primacy of reason. The exponents of these two schoolswaged a bitter battle in which the first salvo was fired by Al-Ghazaliwith his book,
The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah).Ibn Rushd answered with his brilliant treatise in defense ofrationality, “The Incoherence of the Incoherence” (Tahafut Al Tahafut).But despite his spirited defense, the outcome of the battle was clearlyin Al-Ghazali’s favor, and the great majority of Islamic juristsadopted his ideas, interpreting the precepts of Islamic law by appealto the authority of tradition, and spurning deductive reasoningaltogether. Islamic jurisprudence was dominated by the Mutakallimun,(dialectical theologians), who asserted the primacy of tradition (
naql), as advocated by Al-Ghazali, over that of reason (
‘aql), as advocated by Ibn Rushd.
Inthe course of this journey, I developed a strong aversion for those Icall “worshippers of the word” and “prisoners of tradition,” and aprofound admiration for the proponents of reason, most notably, ofcourse, Ibn Rushd (Averroes). His championship of the primacy ofreason, though rejected by the Muslim world, took root strongly inEurope, particularly in France, which embraced his visionwholeheartedly. Europe’s gain was our loss; as in turning our backs onIbn Rushd, we lost a historic opportunity for development. A closereading of all of Ibn Taymiyah’s works, as well as the works of hisdisciples, from Ibn Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya to Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab atthe end of the eighteenth century, only heightened my admiration forthe Mu’tazalites, who emphasized human responsibility in matters ofreligion, and for liberal thinkers who chose the path of reason overthat of dogma -- like Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), Al-Farabi and the leadingexponent of this school, Ibn Rushd.
When one compares some ofthe works of Al-Ghazali [or example, “The Revival of the ReligiousSciences” (Ihya’ Ulum ad-Din), “The Criterion of Knowledge” (Mi’yaral-‘Elm), “The Criterion of Work” (Mi’yar al-‘Amal), “Salvation FromPerdition” (Al-Monqedh Min al’Dallal), “The Essence of Orthodoxy”(Al-Mustafa Min Elm al-Osoul) and the “Incoherence of the Philosophers”(Tahafut al-Falasifah)] which are distinctly lacking in rationality]with the writings of Ibn Rushd, [For example, “The DistinguishedJurist’s Primer” (Bidayat al-Mujtahid Wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid),“Relationship of Religious Law with Philosophy” (Fasl al-Maqal fi mabayn al-Shari`a wa al-hikma min al-Ittisal), “Islamic Doctrine and ItsProofs” (Al-Kashf `an Manahij al-Adilla fi `Aqa’id al-Milla). in whichrationality reigns supreme] one cannot help being amazed that thebattle waged between the exponents of these two distinct schools tencenturies ago should have ended up in a clear victory for Al-Ghazaliand a crushing defeat for Ibn Rushd. Nowhere is the difference in theapproach of the two men more evident than in their defining works:Al-Ghazali’s “The Incoherence of the Philosophers” and Ibn Rushd’s “TheIncoherence of the Incoherence.”
Why had the Muslims chosen to follow the line advocated by Al-Ghazali,the proponent of orthodoxy and tradition -- for whom knowledge meantonly knowledge of religion, and who cancelled the role of the mindaltogether by denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge throughintuition -- over the line advocated by Ibn Rushd -- who upheld theprimacy of reason and sowed the seeds of a renaissance we chose not toreap? Why were Al-Ghazali’s ideas so readily accepted while Ibn Rushd’swere rejected? The answer, I believe, can be summed up in one word:Despotism.
It is also amazing how historians of Islamic thought concealed the factthat Al-Ghazali was unfailingly supportive of despotic rulers, contraryto Ibn Rushd, who was a constant source of irritation for tyrants whowere determined to keep their subjects in a state of intellectualinertia, thereby guaranteeing the perpetuation of the status quo andtheir continued authority unchallenged. If an active mind is the sourceof questions, and questions lead to accountability, questions have eyesand answers are blind.
At a time when despotism in the Arab and Muslim world was at itsheight, therefore, it is not surprising that Muslim rulers should havefound Al-Ghazali’s ideas more appealing than those of Ibn Rushd.
Theorthodox line was also more appealing to their subjects who, under theyoke of tyranny, found it safer and less demanding to go along with theviews of those who required nothing more from them than a suspension oftheir critical faculties. In Europe, where the forces of enlightenmentwere locked in a confrontation with the clericalism that stifledintellectual initiative and rational thought, despotism was in retreat.This could be why, in the thirteenth century, a prestigious center oflearning such as the University of Paris supported the ideas of theArab Muslim Ibn Rushd over those of the European Christian ThomasAquinas, the scholastic philosopher famous for his two-swords doctrine.
TheMuslim world continued to be ruled by despots who brooked no challengeto their authority, and an equally despotic religious establishmentwhich decried the use of reason and demanded blind adherence to theauthority of tradition. Closely linked in methods, motivations andgoals, these two factors created an atmosphere inimical to theunhindered pursuit of knowledge.
Matters, however, were not just black or white. True, the Muslims losta historic opportunity to use Ibn Rushd’s ideas as a springboard thatcould have placed them on a path similar to the one which took Europefrom the obscurantist thinking of the thirteenth century to thevigorous intellectual climate encouraging debate, free thinking,general freedoms and creativity in literature, art and science. ButMuslims also have known both an Islam which allowed for the acceptanceof the “Other,” and another Islam --rigid, doctrinaire, and violentlyrepressing free thought. The first took hold in the more intellectuallyvibrant climate that prevailed among the peoples descended from ancientcivilizations in places like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the Levant, whichI call the “Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam.” The second, bestdescribed as the Bedouin model, was espoused by the secret sects(limited in number and influence) who emerged in remote areas of theArabian Peninsula together with the rise of Wahhabism, a puritanrevival launched by Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab, born in Najd in 1703.
Althoughthe first model of Islam can in no way be described as secular, itadopted an enlightened approach to religion, dealing with it as asystem of spiritual beliefs rather than as a system that ruled allaspects of life and governed the affairs of society. Even if it cannotclaim to have attained the level of enlightenment, progressive thinkingand freedom that characterizes the ideas of Ibn Rushd, it wasnevertheless a gentle and tolerant Islam that could -- and did --coexist with others.
Meanwhile, the altogether differentBedouin model of Islam was taking shape among geographically isolatedcommunities living far from coastlines and hence from exposure to theoutside world. Their insularity provided an ideal breeding ground forthe ideas of Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Qaiyim Al-Jawzeya and, towards the endof the eighteenth century, those of Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab.
Thiswas the model that produced the Saudi Brotherhood who waged war on KingAbdul Aziz Ibn-Saud (1870-1953) in the nineteen twenties. It has sincemetamorphosed into a powerful ideology thanks to the combination of theideas of Sayed Qutb, petrodollars, and a series of blunders on the partof international, regional and local players. One such blunder was thefefeat of the Russians in Afghanistan at the end of the seventies.Another was the late President Sadat’s ill-advised decision to givefree rein to Islamic groups and consider them allies in his war on theLeft. Not surprisingly, the move was orchestrated by senior members ofthe Muslim Brotherhood acting through their mouthpiece, the wealthybusinessman and close confidante of Sadat, Osman Ahmed Osman.
The Growth of WahhabismThe man who founded Wahhabismwas not a theologian but a proselytizer who was determined to convertthe faithful to his harsh brand of Islam. Intellectually close to thedialectical Islamic theologians who asserted the primacy of tradition (
naql) over reason (
‘aql),Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab was a disciple of Ibn-Taymiyah, a stricttraditionalist who allowed little scope for reason or independentthinking. He was also a product of his geographical environment, aremote outpost of history. Unlike Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq andYemen, where ancient civilizations had flourished and left their markon human history, or places like al-Hijaz and a number of the Gulfcoastal line cities, which lay on trade routes and dealt extensivelywith the outside world, the desert of Najd in the Eastern Province ofwhat is now Saudi Arabia had no civilization to speak of before Islam.Nor did it ever become a cultural center like the various capitals ofthe Caliphate: Medina, Damascus and Baghdad. Thanks to its arid, barrenlandscape, Najd remained a cultural backwater, its sole contribution tothe arts a traditional form of poetry that spoke of narrow tribalmatters.
In 1744, Abdul Wahhab forged an alliance with theruler of Al-Dir’iyah, a tribal chieftain by the name of MohamedIbn-Saud, who became his son-in-law. The alliance led to the firstincarnation of the Saudi state, which, by 1804, had expanded to controlnearly one million square meters of the Arabian Peninsula.
Acollision between the two models of Islam was inevitable; in the seconddecade of the nineteenth century, they confronted one another on thebattlefield. Mohamed Ali, who introduced Egypt and the entire region tothe modern age, sent a huge army to the Arabian Peninsula. Led first bythe Egyptian ruler’s son, Tousson, then by Tousson’s younger brother,Ibrahim, the army had as its objective the destruction of the newlyestablished state in the Eastern Province of the Arabian Peninsula.Based in Najd, that state was governed according to the strict Wahhabiinterpretation of Islam. In 1818, under the command of Ibrahim Pasha,arguably the greatest of the Egyptian ruler’s sons, the Egyptian army,and with it, the more enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam,emerged victorious. They defeated the enemy, destroyed their capital,Al-Dir’iyah, and captured its leader, later executed in Istanbul.
MohamedAli’s decision to first send his son Tousson followed by his sonIbrahim Pasha, known for his military skills, to destroy the firstSaudi state, had implications going far beyond the political ormilitary ambitions of one man. It was in fact an expression of a“cultural and civilizational” confrontation between the two models ofIslam -- a confrontation the enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model decidedto take to the heartland of the obscurantist, extremist and fanaticalWahhabi model.
Mohamed Ali, who was extremely impressed by theEuropean model of development -- and saw no contradiction between themechanisms by which it had come about and his Islamic beliefs --believed the Wahhabi understanding of Islam stood as a major obstaclein the way of the dream he had nurtured since coming to power in 1805(and until he abdicated in favour of his son Ibrahim in 1848) to placeEgypt on a similar road to development. However, although the moderate,tolerant, mainstream version of Islam, which accepted coexistence inpeace in with others and was not pathologically opposed to progress andmodernity, emerged victorious in that particular round of itsconfrontation with the forces of obscurantism, it was later forced toretreat before the internal factors mentioned before: oppression,absence of social mobility, spread of incompetence, despair, outdatededucational systems and corruption.
The years that followed werenot kind to Turkey and Egypt. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire afterWorld War I brought an end to Turkey’s ascendancy, while Egypt’sinfluence receded as its economy and educational system declined. Atthe same time, the proponents of the model of Islam -- which demanded astrict adherence to the letter of scripture and had slammed the doorshut in the face of rationality --suddenly found themselves in controlof vast wealth unprecedented in history. This gave the Saudis anenormous edge over their moderate rivals and allowed them to extendtheir influence into the traditional strongholds of theTurkish-Egyptian model of Islam, where they waged a systematic campaignto co-opt the establishment elite and institutions. The success of thiscampaign found its most salient expression in the emergence offanatical movements like the Taliban. This other stricter version ofIslam found, therefore, for the first time, opportunities to spread itsuncompromising message to every corner of the world, aided byinternational conditions (and lack of vision) which allowed what hadonce been an obscure sect confined behind the sand dunes of Najd toimpose itself on the world stage and boldly proclaim its brand of Islamas the one and only true Islam.
As the drama played out, some ofthe spectators chose to look the other way, while the sword-wieldinghero of the piece was playing the role required of him at the time.
They thus failed to realize that the hero was no longer sticking to thescript set for him, but was now playing a much more central anddangerous role.
This unfortunate state of affairs could have been avoided if themajority of Muslims had supported Ibn Rushd’s ideas, or if conditionshad not forced the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model.
Theharsh and unforgiving environment in which the Najdis lived explainswhy Mohamed Ibn-Abdul Wahhab found a receptive audience for his equallyharsh and unforgiving brand of Islam. The same environment thatproduced the founder of Wahhabism later produced the radical
Ikhwan movement, which challenged the authority of King Abdul Aziz Ibn-Saud.
In the nineteen twenties, the king took on the
Ikhwan,who were openly accusing him of deviating from the true faith. When hereturned to Riyadh after joining Hijaz to his kingdom, the
Ikhwan said that he had left on a camel and returned in an American car.
Thiswas just one of many clashes between the movement and the king oversuch issues as whether the radio was sinful, or the telephone aninvention of the devil -- in short, conflicts over any of the fruits ofmodernity which threatened their fundamentalist vision of the world.
Itis a vision that can only be understood by studying what is known asthe secret sects of Islam, as well as the message of Mohamed Ibn-AbdulWahhab, who was the product of many factors, including the sociologicaland geopolitical environment of the deserts of Najd.
Thesefactors allowed the Wahhabis, after they invaded Hijaz, to impose theiraustere understanding of religion throughout the Arabian Peninsula.Among other things, they banned tombstones and any structuresidentifying burial sites, insisting on unmarked graves flush with theland. They combated Sufism in Mecca and elsewhere as contrary to theteachings of Islam. They even entered into an armed clash with theEgyptian
mahmal, a splendidly decorated litter on which the Egyptians sent a new cover for the
Ka’bah every year.
The
mahmalceremony was a merry occasion celebrated by the Egyptians with theirtraditional love of music, dancing and revelry. For the Najdis,however, who had launched their puritanical revival movement to purgeIslam of what they saw as deviations from the straight and true path oforthodoxy, such unseemly displays of levity could not be tolerated.
Mostimportantly, throughout its history, the desert wasteland of theArabian Peninsula’s Eastern Province had suffered greatly from itsgeography. However, with the richest oil fields and the oil price boomthat turned the desert kingdom into a major financial power, it wasinevitable that this part of the world should try to market its ideas.
Thisit did with missionary zeal in the second half of the twentiethcentury. With a virtually endless supply of funds at their disposal,the Wahhabis were able to successfully propagate their model of Islamthroughout the Arab and Muslim world and start to instill it in theWest. Disillusioned populations, facing massive internal problemscaused by political oppression and its consequences were easy prey, andmainstream Islam gradually lost ground to the austere, puritanicalWahhabi model that was now presenting itself as the one and only trueIslam.
Flawed EducationEducational systems that are out of step with the age are a vital link in the chain of destruction.
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