This article is Part II of Alastair Crooke's historical analysis of the roots of ISIS and its impact on the future of the Middle East.
BEIRUT -- ISIS is indeed a veritable time bomb inserted into the heart of the Middle East. But its destructive power is not as commonly understood. It is not with the "March of the Beheaders"; it is not with the killings; the seizure of towns and villages; the harshest of "justice" -- terrible though they are -- that its true explosive power lies. It is yet more potent than its exponential pull on young Muslims, its huge arsenal of weapons and its hundreds of millions of dollars.
Its real potential for destruction lies elsewhere -- in the implosion of Saudi Arabia as a foundation stone of the modern Middle East. We should understand that there is really almost nothing that the West can now do about it but sit and watch.
The clue to its truly explosive potential, as Saudi scholar Fouad Ibrahim has pointed out (but which has passed, almost wholly overlooked, or its significance has gone unnoticed), is ISIS' deliberate and intentional use in its doctrine -- of the language of Abd-al Wahhab, the 18th century founder, together with Ibn Saud, of Wahhabism and the Saudi project:
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the first "prince of the faithful" in the Islamic State of Iraq, in 2006 formulated, for instance, the principles of his prospective state ... Among its goals is disseminating monotheism "which is the purpose [for which humans were created] and [for which purpose they must be called] to Islam..." This language replicates exactly Abd-al Wahhab's formulation. And, not surprisingly, the latter's writings and Wahhabi commentaries on his works are widely distributed in the areas under ISIS' control and are made the subject of study sessions. Baghdadi subsequently was to note approvingly, "a generation of young men [have been] trained based on the forgotten doctrine of loyalty and disavowal."
And what is this "forgotten" tradition of "loyalty and disavowal?" It is Abd al-Wahhab's doctrine that belief in a sole (for him an anthropomorphic) God -- who was alone worthy of worship -- was in itself insufficient to render man or woman a Muslim?
He or she could be no true believer, unless additionally, he or she actively denied (and destroyed) any other subject of worship. The list of such potential subjects of idolatrous worship, which al-Wahhab condemned as idolatry, was so extensive that almost all Muslims were at risk of falling under his definition of "unbelievers." They therefore faced a choice: Either they convert to al-Wahhab's vision of Islam -- or be killed, and their wives, their children and physical property taken as the spoils of jihad. Even to express doubts about this doctrine, al-Wahhab said, should occasion execution.
The point Fuad Ibrahim is making, I believe, is not merely to reemphasize the extreme reductionism of al-Wahhab's vision, but to hint at something entirely different: That through its intentional adoption of this Wahhabist language, ISIS is knowingly lighting the fuse to a bigger regional explosion -- one that has a very real possibility of being ignited, and if it should succeed, will change the Middle East decisively.
For it was precisely this idealistic, puritan, proselytizing formulation by al-Wahhab that was "father" to the entire Saudi "project" (one that was violently suppressed by the Ottomans in 1818, but spectacularly resurrected in the 1920s, to become the Saudi Kingdom that we know today). But since its renaissance in the 1920s, the Saudi project has always carried within it, the "gene" of its own self-destruction.
THE SAUDI TAIL HAS WAGGED BRITAIN AND U.S. IN THE MIDDLE EASTParadoxically, it was a maverick British official, who helped embed the gene into the new state. The British official attached to Aziz, was one Harry St. John Philby (the father of the MI6 officer who spied for the Soviet KGB, Kim Philby). He was to become King Abd al-Aziz's close adviser, having resigned as a British official, and was until his death, a key member of the Ruler's Court. He, like Lawrence of Arabia, was an Arabist. He was also a convert to Wahhabi Islam and known as Sheikh Abdullah.
St. John Philby was a man on the make: he had determined to make his friend, Abd al-Aziz, the ruler of Arabia. Indeed, it is clear that in furthering this ambition he was not acting on official instructions. When, for example, he encouraged King Aziz to expand in northern Nejd, he was ordered to desist. But (as American author, Stephen Schwartz notes), Aziz was well aware that Britain had pledged repeatedly that the defeat of the Ottomans would produce an Arab state, and this no doubt, encouraged Philby and Aziz to aspire to the latter becoming its new ruler.
It is not clear exactly what passed between Philby and the Ruler (the details seem somehow to have been suppressed), but it would appear that Philby's vision was not confined to state-building in the conventional way, but rather was one of transforming the wider Islamic ummah (or community of believers) into a Wahhabist instrument that would entrench the al-Saud as Arabia's leaders. And for this to happen, Aziz needed to win British acquiescence (and much later, American endorsement). "This was the gambit that Abd al-Aziz made his own, with advice from Philby," notes Schwartz.
BRITISH GODFATHER OF SAUDI ARABIA In a sense, Philby may be said to be "godfather" to this momentous pact by which the Saudi leadership would use its clout to "manage" Sunni Islam on behalf of western objectives (containing socialism, Ba'athism, Nasserism, Soviet influence, Iran, etc.) -- and in return, the West would acquiesce to Saudi Arabia's soft-power Wahhabisation of the Islamic ummah (with its concomitant destruction of Islam's intellectual traditions and diversity and its sowing of deep divisions within the Muslim world).
As a result -- from then until now -- British and American policy has been bound to Saudi aims (as tightly as to their own ones), and has been heavily dependent on Saudi Arabia for direction in pursuing its course in the Middle East.
In political and financial terms, the Saud-Philby strategy has been an astonishing success (if taken on its own, cynical, self-serving terms). But it was always rooted in British and American intellectual obtuseness: the refusal to see the dangerous "gene" within the Wahhabist project, its latent potential to mutate, at any time, back into its original a bloody, puritan strain. In any event, this has just happened: ISIS is it.
Winning western endorsement (and continued western endorsement), however, required a change of mode: the "project" had to change from being an armed, proselytizing Islamic vanguard movement into something resembling statecraft. This was never going to be easy because of the inherent contradictions involved (puritan morality versus realpolitik and money) -- and as time has progressed, the problems of accommodating the "modernity" that statehood requires, has caused "the gene" to become more active, rather than become more inert.
Even Abd al-Aziz himself faced an allergic reaction: in the form of a serious rebellion from his own Wahhabi militia, the Saudi Ikhwan. When the expansion of control by the Ikhwan reached the border of territories controlled by Britain, Abd al-Aziz tried to restrain his militia (Philby was urging him to seek British patronage), but theIkwhan, already critical of his use of modern technology (the telephone, telegraph and the machine gun), "were outraged by the abandonment of jihad for reasons of worldly realpolitik ... They refused to lay down their weapons; and instead rebelled against their king ... After a series of bloody clashes, they were crushed in 1929.Ikhwan members who had remained loyal, were later absorbed into the [Saudi] National Guard."
King Aziz's son and heir, Saud, faced a different form of reaction (less bloody, but more effective). Aziz's son was deposed from the throne by the religious establishment -- in favor of his brother Faisal -- because of his ostentatious and extravagant conduct. His lavish, ostentatious style, offended the religious establishment who expected the "Imam of Muslims," to pursue a pious, proselytizing lifestyle.
King Faisal, Saud's successor, in his turn, was shot by his nephew in 1975, who had appeared at Court ostensibly to make his oath of allegiance, but who instead, pulled out a pistol and shot the king in his head. The nephew had been perturbed by the encroachment of western beliefs and innovation into Wahhabi society, to the detriment of the original ideals of the Wahhabist project.
SEIZING THE GRAND MOSQUE IN 1979
Far more serious, however, was the revived Ikhwan of Juhayman al-Otaybi, which culminated in the seizure of the Grand Mosque by some 400-500 armed men and women in 1979. Juhayman was from the influential Otaybi tribe from the Nejd, which had led and been a principal element in the original Ikhwan of the 1920s.
Juhayman and his followers, many of whom came from the Medina seminary, had the tacit support, amongst other clerics, of Sheikh Abdel-Aziz Bin Baz, the former Mufti of Saudi Arabia. Juhayman stated that Sheikh Bin Baz never objected to hisIkhwan teachings (which were also critical of ulema laxity towards "disbelief"), but that bin Baz had blamed him mostly for harking on that "the ruling al-Saud dynasty had lost its legitimacy because it was corrupt, ostentatious and had destroyed Saudi culture by an aggressive policy of westernisation."
Significantly, Juhayman's followers preached their Ikhwani message in a number of mosques in Saudi Arabia initially without being arrested, but when Juhayman and a number of the Ikhwan finally were held for questioning in 1978. Members of theulema (including bin Baz) cross-examined them for heresy, but then ordered their release because they saw them as being no more than traditionalists harkening back to the Ikhwan-- like Juhayman grandfather -- and therefore not a threat.
Even when the mosque seizure was defeated and over, a certain level of forbearance by the ulema for the rebels remained. When the government asked for a fatwa allowing for armed force to be used in the mosque, the language of bin Baz and other senior ulema was curiously restrained. The scholars did not declare Juhayman and his followers non-Muslims, despite their violation of the sanctity of the Grand Mosque, but only termed them al-jamaah al-musallahah (the armed group).
Because of donations from wealthy followers, the group had been well-armed and trained. Some members, like Juhayman, were former military officials of the Saudi National Guard. Some National Guard troops sympathetic to the insurgents smuggled weapons, ammunition, gas masks, and provisions into the mosque compound over a period of weeks before the attack, including automatic weaponssmuggled from National Guard armories and hidden in rooms under the mosque that were used as hermitages.
ISIS VS. WESTERNIZED SAUDIS
The point of rehearsing this history is to underline how uneasy the Saudi leadership must be at the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Previous Ikhwani manifestations were suppressed -- but these all occurred inside the kingdom.
ISIS however, is a neo-Ikhwani rejectionist protest that is taking place outside the kingdom -- and which, moreover, follows the Juhayman dissidence in its trenchant criticism of the al-Saud ruling family.
This is the deep schism we see today in Saudi Arabia, between the modernizing current of which King Abdullah is a part, and the "Juhayman" orientation of which bin Laden, and the Saudi supporters of ISIS and the Saudi religious establishment are a part. It is also a schism that exists within the Saudi royal family itself.
According to the Saudi-owned Al-Hayat newspaper, in July 2014 "an opinion poll of Saudis [was] released on social networking sites, claiming that 92 percent of the target group believes that 'IS conforms to the values of Islam and Islamic law.'" The leading Saudi commentator, Jamal Khashoggi, recently warned of ISIS' Saudi supporters who "watch from the shadows."
There are angry youths with a skewed mentality and understanding of life and sharia, and they are canceling a heritage of centuries and the supposed gains of a modernization that hasn't been completed. They turned into rebels, emirs and a caliph invading a vast area of our land. They are hijacking our children's minds and canceling borders. They reject all rules and legislations, throwing it [a]way ... for their vision of politics, governance, life, society and economy. [For] the citizens of the self-declared "commander of the faithful," or Caliph, you have no other choice ... They don't care if you stand out among your people and if you are an educated man, or a lecturer, or a tribe leader, or a religious leader, or an active politician or even a judge ... You must obey the commander of the faithful and pledge the oath of allegiance to him. When their policies are questioned, Abu Obedia al-Jazrawi yells, saying: "Shut up. Our reference is the book and the Sunnah and that's it."
"What did we do wrong?" Khashoggi asks. With 3,000-4,000 Saudi fighters in the Islamic State today, he advises of the need to "look inward to explain ISIS' rise". Maybe it is time, he says, to admit "our political mistakes," to "correct the mistakes of our predecessors."
MODERNIZING KING THE MOST VULNERABLEThe present Saudi king, Abdullah, paradoxically is all the more vulnerable precisely because he has been a modernizer. The King has curbed the influence of the religious institutions and the religious police -- and importantly has permitted the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence to be used, by those who adhere to them (al-Wahhab, by contrast, objected to all other schools of jurisprudence other than his own).
It is even possible too for Shiite residents of eastern Saudi Arabia to invoke Ja'afri jurisprudence and to turn to Ja'afari Shiite clerics for rulings. (In clear contrast, al-Wahhab held a particular animosity towards the Shiite and held them to be apostates. As recently as the 1990s, clerics such as bin Baz -- the former Mufti -- and Abdullah Jibrin reiterated the customary view that the Shiite were infidels).
Some contemporary Saudi ulema would regard such reforms as constituting almost a provocation against Wahhabist doctrines, or at the very least, another example of westernization. ISIS, for example, regards any who seek jurisdiction other than that offered by the Islamic State itself to be guilty of disbelief -- since all such "other" jurisdictions embody innovation or "borrowings" from other cultures in its view.
The key political question is whether the simple fact of ISIS' successes, and the full manifestation (flowering) of all the original pieties and vanguardism of the archetypal impulse, will stimulate and activate the dissenter 'gene' -- within the Saudi kingdom.
If it does, and Saudi Arabia is engulfed by the ISIS fervor, the Gulf will never be the same again. Saudi Arabia will deconstruct and the Middle East will be unrecognizable.
In short, this is the nature of the time bomb tossed into the Middle East. The ISIS allusions to Abd al-Wahhab and Juhayman (whose dissident writings are circulated within ISIS) present a powerful provocation: they hold up a mirror to Saudi society that seems to reflect back to them an image of "purity" lost and early beliefs and certainties displaced by shows of wealth and indulgence.
This is the ISIS "bomb" hurled into Saudi society. King Abdullah -- and his reforms -- are popular, and perhaps he can contain a new outbreak of Ikwhani dissidence. But will that option remain a possibility after his death?
And here is the difficulty with evolving U.S. policy, which seems to be one of "leading from behind" again -- and looking to Sunni states and communities to coalesce in the fight against ISIS (as in Iraq with the Awakening Councils).
It is a strategy that seems highly implausible. Who would want to insert themselves into this sensitive intra-Saudi rift? And would concerted Sunni attacks on ISIS make King Abdullah's situation better, or might it inflame and anger domestic Saudi dissidence even further? So whom precisely does ISIS threaten? It could not be clearer. It does not directly threaten the West (though westerners should remain wary, and not tread on this particular scorpion).
The Saudi Ikhwani history is plain: As Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab made it such in the 18th century; and as the Saudi Ikhwan made it such in the 20th century. ISIS' real target must be the Hijaz -- the seizure of Mecca and Medina -- and the legitimacy that this will confer on ISIS as the new Emirs of Arabia.
"Choose a job you love and you will not have to work a day in your life" (Confucius)
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Iran has disrupted plots by foreign spies to recruit its nuclear experts and stopped sabotage attempts through faulty foreign equipment supplied for its facilities, the deputy head of the Islamic Republic's nuclear department told The Associated Press.
The comments by Asghar Zarean, who is in charge of security for Iran's nuclear program, came during a visit by an AP team to Iran's Atomic Energy Organization in Tehran organized by state officials. It also comes as Iran continues negotiations with world powers over its contested nuclear program and after authorities said they shot down a purported Israeli drone near one of its atomic facilities.
"We aim to raise awareness about the enemy, who is more hostile to us every day," Zarean said in an interview Monday, without naming the countries that authorities believe are behind the sabotage and the recruitment effort.
Iran's nuclear program has been the target of sabotage in the past. In 2010, the so-called Stuxnet virus temporarily disrupted operation of thousands of centrifuges, key components in nuclear fuel production, at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
Iran says it and other computer virus attacks are part of a concerted effort by Israel, the U.S. and their allies to undermine its nuclear program through covert operations. Israel has never commented on the allegations but is widely believed to have been involved in the Stuxnet attack.
In the interview Monday, Zarean said foreign intelligence agencies targeted the experts when they traveled abroad and that the experts informed their superiors about the contact when they returned home. He did not elaborate on number of the attempts and destinations where the alleged contact occurred.
Zarean also showed AP journalists parts and equipment, including modems and pumps, which he said had been deliberately tampered with to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. He described the items on display, which he said had been manufactured in Western and Asian countries, as only a small sample of Western sabotage.
Experts also demonstrated what they described as a real-time monitoring system that detects malware and cyberattacks on its nuclear program, without elaborating on its abilities. AP journalists weren't allowed to tour a nearby nuclear research reactor that went online with American help in 1967 — before Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution strained ties between the two countries.
The U.S. and its allies fear Iran's nuclear program could allow it to build atomic weapons. Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, like generating electricity and medical research.
Last November, Iran reached an interim deal with world powers over its nuclear program, agreeing to limit some of its uranium enrichment in exchange for some sanctions to be eased. The Islamic Republic now faces a November deadline to negotiate a final deal with world powers.
Despite the negotiations, Zarean said its program remains a target for foreign spies, pointing at Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard shooting down a purported Israeli drone last month near the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, some 240 kilometers (150 miles) south of the capital, Tehran. Israel has not commented on the drone, which Iranian officials said came from a northern country that once was part of the Soviet Union.
"With the dominance, resistance and vigilance that our defense system has shown, any flying object aiming to approach our nuclear sites will be targeted," Zarean said. "We are not joking with anyone. From now on they will see that (our response) to such jokes will be serious."
An Iranian official says foreign agencies attempted to recruit the country's nuclear experts. Equipment sabotage claim
Baghdad (AFP) - Angry relatives of missing Iraqi soldiers stormed the parliament building in Baghdad on Tuesday, attacked MPs and staged a sit-in for several hours in its main chamber, an official said.
They demanded information on the fate of relatives who surrendered to jihadists in June and also called for commanders to be held accountable, said the official, who was present in parliament.
The hundreds of demonstrators assaulted some MPs as well parliamentary staff, and smashed chairs in the cafeteria, he added.
Parliament had convened to discuss the issue on Tuesday, but the building was stormed before the start of the session.
The protesters later left the building and parliament speaker Salim al-Juburi met with their representatives at his home, the official said.
An emergency session of parliament, with relatives in attendance, will be held on Wednesday, Juburi's office said in a statement.
Around 1,700 soldiers surrendered to the jihadist Islamic State (IS) group in June as its fighters seized second city Mosul and swept south towards Baghdad.
IS subsequently released photographs of dozens of men in civilian clothes apparently being executed by firing squad in a desert area, and said that it had killed hundreds in total.
Security forces were swept aside by the initial IS-led onslaught, but have since retaken areas northeast of Baghdad with the backing of Shiite militiamen and Kurdish fighters.
KIEV, Ukraine (AP) — The office of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said Wednesday that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin are in agreement on a cease-fire in eastern Ukraine, but the statement was ambiguous and a top rebel figure said no cease-fire was possible without Ukraine withdrawing its forces.
The brief statement said "mutual understanding was reached regarding the steps that will contribute to the establishment of peace" but gave no details.
There have been previous statements of agreements on steps for peace, but the conflict has only intensified. Wednesday's statement came as U.S. President Barack Obama arrived in Estonia in a show of solidarity with NATO allies who fear they could be the next target of Russia's aggression.
Poroshenko's office first said that there "agreement on a permanent cease-fire," but later revised the statement to say "agreement on a cease-fire regime." The changes appeared in Ukrainian, Russian and English-language versions issued by the office.
That appeared to indicate they were in agreement on conditions necessary for a cease-fire, not that one would imminently be implemented.
Vladislav Brrig, a rebel official, told The Associated Press, "As long as Ukrainian forces are on the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic there can be no ceasefire"
The rebels ignored a 10-day unilateral cease-fire that Poroshenko had called in June.
Russian markets jumped on first reports of an agreement. The MICEX benchmark was 3 percent higher while the ruble rose 1.2 percent against the U.S. dollar.
Germany's Dax index, which has been particularly sensitive to news regarding the Ukrainian crisis because of the country's economic ties with Russia, was up 1.6 percent.
At midday, the MICEX had eased to 2.7 percent higher and the DAX was up 1.2 percent.
Obama said it was too early to tell what the announcement meant. He noted previous unsuccessful attempts and questioned whether pro-Russian separatists would abide by any cease-fire.
"We haven't seen a lot of follow-up on so-called announced cease-fires," Obama said. "Having said that, if in fact Russia is prepared to stop financing, arming, training, in many cases joining with Russian troops, activities in Ukraine and is serious about a political settlement, that is something we all hope for."
Ukraine and the West have accused Russia of sending its troops and weapons to support pro-Russian insurgents who have been fighting government forces in eastern Ukraine since mid-April. Moscow has vehemently denied this charge.
That denial leaves unclear how effective the truce announced Wednesday would prove to be. After a meeting with Poroshenko last week, Putin had said a cease-fire was not discussed because Russia was not a party to the conflict.
Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, was quoted by Russian news agencies on Wednesday as saying the leaders had "largely agreed on steps that would be conducive to a cease-fire," but repeated that Russia is not involved in the fighting.
Rebel leader said earlier this week that they would respect Ukraine's sovereignty in exchange for autonomy. The rebels previously have called for full independence for their regions or possible absorption into Russia. Poroshenko has spoken in favor of devolving some of the central government's power to regions, but that is far short of autonomy for the rebel regions.
Over the weekend, the European Union leaders agreed to prepare a new round of sanctions that could be enacted in a week, after NATO accused Russia of sending tanks and troops into southeastern Ukraine. A NATO summit in Wales on Thursday is also expected to approve measures designed to counter Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine.
Fighting in eastern Ukraine has killed nearly 2,600 people and forced over 340,000 to flee their homes, according to the U.N.
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Vasilyeva reported from Moscow. Peter Leonard in Mariupol, Ukraine, contributed reporting.
Ukraine says cease-fire reached with Russia
Russia says it agreed on steps toward peace in eastern Ukraine, but insists it is not a party to the fighting. No word from rebels
WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. is adding 350 more troops to help protect the American Embassy in Baghdad and its support facilities in the capital, raising the number of U.S. forces in the country to over 1,000, officials said Tuesday.
President Barack Obama approved the additional troops for protection of American personnel following a request by the State Department and a review and recommendation by the Defense Department, the White House said in a statement.
The buildup of U.S. troops in Baghdad follows the growing threat from Islamic State militants in northern Iraq. Since early August the U.S. has carried out 124 airstrikes against the militants, the latest taking place near Mosul Dam on Monday.
The additional troops will not serve in a combat role, the White House said. Most are from the Army and some are Marines, the Pentagon said in a statement.
Approximately 820 troops have now been assigned to augment diplomatic security in Iraq, said Rear Adm. John Kirby, the Pentagon's spokesman.
The additional troops will come from within the U.S. Central Command area of operations and will include a headquarters element, medical personnel, associated helicopters and an air liaison team, Kirby said. Fifty-five troops in Baghdad since June will be redeployed outside of Iraq and replaced by 405 newly deployed troops, he said.
The airstrike Monday near Mosul Dam involved fighters and attack aircraft that damaged or destroyed 16 armed vehicles, Central Command said in a statement late Tuesday.
The addition of 350 soldiers in Baghdad raises the number of U.S. forces in the country to over 1,000. State Department request