To Mr.Dulle, Your help in Apostolic reasoning is a joy and a blessing. From:Elder Lockett Introduction Christianity emerged from within the background of Jewish monotheism. One of the problems facing early Christians was how to reconcile Biblical monotheism with the fact that the New Testament (NT) makes hundreds of distinctions between the Father and Son, and to a lesser degree, the Holy Spirit. If God is one, how could the Father and Son both be God seeing that the Father and Son are spoken of as distinct? The Data In order to understand the weight of the problem we will examine several passages of Scripture that elucidate the distinctions we find in the NT between Father, Son, and Spirit. In the Great Commission, Jesus said all power was given to Him in heaven and in earth (Matthew 28:18). To be given something implies both a giver and a receiver, and thus a distinction between Jesus and the one who gave Him all power. Jesus said the Father was greater than He (John 14:28). Did Jesus mean that He was greater than Himself? On another occasion He said, "The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do; for whatever he does, the Son does likewise. For the Father loves the Son and shows him all things that he himself does" (John 5:19-20; See also 3:32). We have one showing, and one doing. He plainly said of His own ability, "I can of mine own self do nothing" (John 5:30). Even the words Jesus taught were first given Him by the Father (John 12:49-50). We have one giving, and one receiving. All such statements draw a distinction between Father and Son. Furthermore, Jesus said, "…even as I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in his love" (John 15:10b). One cannot keep their own commandments and abide in their own love. Such a statement implies the existence of one who gives the commandment, and one who keeps the commandment; one who loves, and one who abides in that love. Jesus spoke of the Father as being with Him (8:29), and Himself as proceeding from and being sent by the Father (8:42; 14:24; 16:27-28; 17:8, 18), as returning to Him (16:5, 7, 10), and as being sanctified by Him (10:36). The Father is even said to honor the Son (8:55). Jesus told His disciples that He would pray to the Father to send the Spirit to them. The Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, speaking not of Himself, but speaking that which He will hear (hear from who?). The Spirit is even said to glorify Jesus (John 14:16-17; 15:26; 16:13-14). On another occasion Jesus said that if we love Him, then His Father will love us, and they will come to us and make their abode with us (John 14:23). Why does Jesus speak of Him and the Father in the plural if God is one? Finally, Jesus said, "My Father has not left me alone; for I always do those things that please him" (John 8:29). Did He mean to say that He always pleased Himself, or that His human nature pleased His divine nature? If we wish to preserve the unity of Christ's person we would have to answer in the negative. It seems evident that Jesus was speaking of the Father as being someone other than Himself. Reconciling the Problem: Trinitarianism and Modalistic Monarchianism One way of reconciling this dilemma came in the form of Trinitarianism. They maintained that Father, Son, and Spirit are three eternally distinct persons within the one essence1 of God. Trinitarians maintained the two truths that God is one and that Jesus is God, but did so at the expense of redefining "one" to mean a "unity" of three persons within the one essence of God. Such a redefining of monotheism brought the church to the borders of Tritheism. While it retained its belief in monotheism on a semantic level, it abandoned monotheism on the conceptual level. A quite different attempt to reconcile this dilemma was made in the form of Modalistic Monarchianism.2 They maintained that Father, Son, and Spirit were three modes of the one person of God. The Modalists had two basic approaches to solving the theological problem. The first approach was to argue that "Son" referred strictly to Jesus' humanity, while "Father" referred strictly to Jesus' deity. Hippolytus, in The Refutation of all Heresies IX said of Callistus' teaching that he did not want to say that the Father suffered, but only the Son, and the Father along with him. Such an explanation clearly demonstrates the tendency to ascribe "Son" only to Christ's humanity, rather than His whole person. And again in book X he said of Callistus, " And he is disposed (to maintain), that He who was seen in the flesh and was crucified is Son, but that the Father it is who dwells in Him." Tertullian, in Against Praxeas ch.27, also recorded such theological tendencies in Praxeas' theology. Seeing that the angel told Mary, "Therefore that Holy Thing which shall be born of you shall be called the Son of God," Tertullian said the followers of Praxeas argued that since "it was the flesh that was born, it must be the flesh that is the Son of God." He went on to say against Praxeas and his followers: "They endeavor to interpret this distinction in a way which shall nevertheless tally with their own opinions: so that, all in one Person, they distinguish two, Father and Son, understanding the Son to be flesh, that is man, that is Jesus; and the Father to be spirit, that is God, that is Christ. Thus they, while contending that the Father and the Son are one and the same, do in fact begin by dividing them rather than uniting them. For if Jesus is one, and Christ is another, then the Son will be different from the Father, because the Son is Jesus, and the Father is Christ." Such a use of the Biblical terms cannot be justified from Scripture, and Trinitarians such as Tertullian were quick to point this out. See Appendix I and II for a fuller discussion on the proper use of "Son" and "Father." The second approach to solving the theological problem was made by removing any real distinction between Father and Son, even the removal of any distinct referent to the appellations, "Father" and "Son." They argued that the distinctions were merely nominal, applicable to God in different modes, but did not indicate any real distinction of person. Since both appellations referred to the same God they were equally exchangeable in use, able to be used as virtual synonyms. Dionysius, for example, in his treatise Against the Sabellians, described Sabellius' teaching in the following manner: "For he blasphemes in saying that the Son Himself is the Father, and vice versa." Hippolytus, in The Refutation of all Heresies X said "the Noetians suppose that this Father Himself is called Son, (and vice versa,) in reference to the events which at their own proper periods happen to them severally." He continued to say concerning Callistus that "he acknowledges that there is one Father and God…and that this (God) is spoken of, and called by the name of Son, yet that in substance He is one Spirit. For Spirit, as the Deity, is, he says, not any being different from the Logos, or the Logos from the Deity; therefore this one person, (according to Callistus,) is divided nominally, but substantially not so." One Modalist, Sabellius, apparently went so far as to call God the huiopater (Son-Father). The Modalists thus maintained the two truths that God is numerically one, and that Jesus is God, but did so at the expense of ignoring and/or explaining away the Biblical statements that made a distinction between Father and Son.3 Trinitarians violently reacted to this explanation because it disregarded the hundreds of distinctions we find in the NT between Father and Son.4 They maintained that the distinctions had to be genuine. In this they were right. Where they were wrong was in their understanding of the nature of the distinctions. They wrongly interpreted the distinctions as eternal and personal within God's essence, rather than temporal distinctions arising because of the incarnation. Where Modalism and Trinitarianism Went Wrong We have, then, two positions that tried to do justice to both the oneness of God and the Biblical distinctions between Father, Son, and Spirit. Both positions failed in their attempt, however, because they overemphasized one aspect of the Biblical witness, and in doing so had to redefine or virtually ignore the other. The Trinitarians so heavily emphasized the distinction passages that they had to redefine the oneness passages. The Modalists so heavily emphasized the oneness passages that on a practical level they denied any real distinction between the Father and Son. If we wish to do full justice to the Biblical data we must adopt a position that emphasizes both God's uni-personal nature and adequately explains the hundreds of distinctions we find being made between the Father and Son. This, Modalism and Trinitarianism did not do.5 The Proper Acknowledgment of the Distinctions While modern Oneness believers have correctly found affinity with the Modalistic position as the historic precursor of Oneness theology, we must not too readily identify ourselves with the entirety of their theology. There were certain theological weaknesses inherent to Modalism that Oneness theology ought to avoid if it wishes to do full justice to the distinction passages, and to avoid some of the same attacks that were justly leveled against Modalism's explanation of the entire corpus of Biblical data. Modalism rightly rejected an eternal and personal distinction in God's essence as does Oneness theology, but wrongly ignored the temporal distinction of existence between the Father and Son that arose in the incarnation because of the addition of humanity to God's previously unmitigated existence as exclusive deity. Whereas Trinitarianism overemphasized and misunderstood the distinctions, Modalism ignored them or explained them away.6 Oneness theology can rise above the errors of both positions by acknowledging the genuineness of the distinctions, but find a better way of explaining the reason for their existence all the while maintaining its insistence on the uni-personal nature of God. Historically speaking Oneness theology has tended to mimic Modalism's explanation of Father and Son as being mere nominal devices to refer to the same person of God, seeing no real distinction between the terms.7 This in turn has caused Oneness believers to use "Father" and "Son" as synonymous equivalents, exchanging one appellation for the other, and thus eliminating any real referential distinction between Father and Son.8 The reason for such a practice is typically the fear of violating the strict monotheism of Scripture. Such caution is well founded, but it has caused some Oneness believers to adopt a hermeneutic which denies any real distinction between Father and Son, and thus ignores or explains away the hundreds of passages that make such a distinction. The fault does not lie in the caution to protect God's oneness, but in the fact that some feel the need to explain away the Biblical distinctions to protect monotheism rather than explain why the distinctions exist. Avoiding the Mistakes of Modalism and Trinitarianism: The Proper Placement of the Distinction Between Father and Son Oneness theology has always been in the quandary of finding a systematic way to confess God as uni-personal, and yet at that same time give reality to the Biblical distinctions between Father and Son, all the while without resorting to a Nestorian view of Christ. On both an academic and lay level, when Oneness theology has admitted a real distinction between Father and Son we have traditionally placed it within Christ between His divine and human natures, thus effectively destroying the unity of His person.9 Such Nestorian slants are so prominent in the Oneness movement that some have concluded it impossible to embrace Oneness theology without simultaneously embracing Nestorianism. Oneness theologians have become aware of our historical bond with Nestorianism, and are currently finding better ways to communicate the monotheistic faith of Scripture without resorting to a Nestorian Christ.10 Not only is it possible to maintain the uni-personal nature of God's eternal essence, a genuine distinction between Father and Son, and the unity of Christ's person, but it is also necessary if we wish to adequately explain the distinction passages. We can avoid Trinitarianism and Nestorianism by placing the distinctions in their proper place. Options for Reconciling the Distinctions When it comes to reconciling the Biblical distinctions between Father and Son with Biblical monotheism we are met with only a few viable options. We could conclude that: 1. It is a separation between two divine essences (Bitheism, Tritheism). 2. It is a distinction between two divine persons within one divine essence (Binitarianism, Trinitarianism). 3. It is a distinction within Jesus, between His divine nature (identified as "Father") and His human nature (identified as "Son"). 4. It is a distinction between YHWH's continued existence beyond the incarnation, and the same YHWH's existence in the incarnation when He brought a human nature into metaphysical11 union with His divine nature. From the Oneness perspective, and for the scope of our purposes here, options one and two are automatically ruled out, leaving only options three and four. Option three posits the Father-Son distinction as internal to Christ between His two natures, while option four posits the Father-Son distinction as external to Christ between God's two modes of existence (in the incarnation as man and beyond the incarnation God). The distinction must be either internal or external to Christ, but cannot be both. We now turn our attention to an evaluation of these two options. An Internal Distinction Between Christ's Natures A Denial of Redemption Option three is not a viable option because it makes an internal separation between Christ's natures, thus destroying the unity of His person and His ability to accomplish our redemption. Redemption is not based on Jesus' sinlessness, nor on the fact that God was in Him, but on the fact that He was God Himself in a metaphysical way due to the union of the divine and human natures in His person. If a mere sinless person could have saved mankind, an incarnation of God was not necessary. All that would be necessary for redemption would be the sacrifice of a man without the sin nature. Such a man could have been brought into existence through miraculous means, just like Adam was brought into existence by miraculous means without a sin nature. If such a man, existed, however, how could his death be vicarious for all of humanity? What would give his death infinite value, sufficient to atone for the sin of the whole world? At best his sinlessness could secure his own personal salvation, but not the salvation of all men. What makes Jesus' sacrifice efficacious12 to atone for the sin of all humanity is the fact that He was God Himself become man, and through His human existence God Himself paid the penalty for our sin in our stead. It was not just a sinless man who died on our behalf, but it was the God-man. Only if Jesus' humanity had a true metaphysical union with the divine nature could Jesus' sacrifice have infinite value. If Jesus' humanity is separate from the divine nature, however, His sacrifice would have been that of a mere man, and could not have atoned for our sins. Splitting Christ in Two Option three turns Jesus into two beings residing in one body, like roommates sharing an apartment. If the distinction between Father and Son occurs between Jesus' divine and human natures, making them two separate entities able of internal communication, then when Jesus spoke He should have referred to "we" and "us," not "I" and "me." Jesus never spoke in such terms because His two natures were metaphysically united in one person, unable of separation, and thus unable of internal communication. Natures do not speak, pray, heal, and teach-people do. Likewise, it was not Christ's natures that spoke, prayed, healed, or taught, but Jesus Himself, the God-man. All of Jesus' actions and words were those of the God-man, not of a mere human or a mere divine nature. It would be impossible for some of Christ's actions to be those of a man and some to be those of God for such a notion posits two persons in Christ, one who is God and one who is man. This is impossible in light of a true incarnation of God. Jesus is God existing as man, not God and a man existing together in one geographical locale; not a divine person and a human person coexisting side-by-side. Because Jesus is God existing as man, there must of necessity be only one personal subject in Christ, not two, and that one personal subject is God.13 In contrast to Jesus who is God existing as man, we are man existing as man. Just as we are the subject of all our actions, likewise God is the subject of all Christ's actions because Christ is simply God existing as man. Christ's humanity is God's humanity by virtue of the incarnational act wherein He Himself became man, and thus all of Christ's acts are those of God Himself in genuine human existence. Jesus, therefore, is not God acting and knowing as God and man acting and knowing as man side-by-side one another, but God acting and knowing as man through His human mode of existence. A Denial of Christ's Essential Deity and of a True Incarnation While those who maintain that the distinction between the Father and Son is a distinction within Christ between His two natures believe that such an explanation is necessary to protect the oneness of God and the deity of Christ, in reality such a position denies Christ's essential deity and a true incarnation of God. If Jesus' humanity was separate from His deity, so that when the Bible says Jesus prayed to the Father it means that Jesus' human nature (only) prayed internally to His divine nature (only), then we must confess that Jesus is just a man in whom the Father dwells. At best, then, it could be said that Jesus and the Father are close because of proximity of location, but it could never be said that Jesus is God Himself. For Jesus to be God, and for God to be man requires an ontological14 union of Jesus' divine and human natures in one existence. A mere indwelling of God in Christ does not describe such a union, and is hardly an incarnation of God in a human existence.15 For a real incarnation to occur there must be an ontological union of the divine and human natures so that God actually comes to be man. If God merely dwells in a human person, the union between deity and humanity in Christ would be phenomenological16 and relational, not real and ontological. A true incarnation, however, demands that Christ's two natures have become united in one individual and ontological reality, not merely one external appearance (Nestorianism).17 Only by such a union can Jesus claim to be God. If God's residence in Christ could make Him divine, then we must confess all believers to be divine, because we too have God residing in us. Having someone in you, and being that someone are different things. The first is a relational association while the latter is an ontological reality/identity. One who is not something in their very identity can at best only be near that something. Either Jesus is metaphysically God Himself because of a vital and essential union between His divine and human natures in one existence, or Jesus is just a man who is full of God's Spirit in a greater measure than ourselves, however still not God Himself. The only difference between Jesus and all other believers, then, would be quantitative, not qualitative. Inaccurate Analogy A popular analogy of the incarnation among Oneness believers has been that of "God robing Himself in flesh." This analogy, however, is inherently Nestorian, denying Christ's essential deity. To illustrate how this is so, consider a human and his/her clothes. It is one thing to say that I am in my clothes, and an entirely other matter to say that I have become my clothes. The former describes a relationship and geographical proximity, while the latter describes an identity. If Jesus' humanity is merely God's robe, then Jesus Christ does not share in God's identity. Jesus, a man, cannot claim to be God. At best He can claim to be used by God or near to God, but He cannot claim to be God anymore than our clothes could claim to be us. To say that the distinction between Father and Son is only a distinction between the divine and human natures, then, is to say that Jesus of Nazareth has a relationship with God, but is not God Himself, forever remaining separate from deity. Such a view is not Oneness, but is akin to the ancient heresy of Adoptionism wherein God adopts an existing man whom He fills with His Spirit to such a capacity that He is "divine-like." For Christ's claims to deity to have any ontological meaning requires a metaphysical union of the divine and human natures in one existence, unable of separation and internal communication. We must confess that in the incarnation God did not wrap Himself in a human body, but rather brought a human nature into metaphysical union with His divine nature so that He has truly become man. Worship of Christ Would Be Idolatrous If Christ is just a man in whom God dwells in a special way, rather than having an essential union with the divine nature, then the worship of Christ is idolatry because we are worshipping a mere human being. Only if Jesus' humanity is metaphysically united with the divine nature can the man from Galilee be considered to be God and be worthy of worship. What makes Jesus God is the fact that God metaphysically joined Himself to a human nature from the very point of conception in Mary's womb, uniting deity and humanity together in one existence. Only by such a union can Jesus truly be the mediator between God and man, because He is in Himself both God and man simultaneously. Jesus' humanity is inexplicably united with the divine nature so that Jesus' humanity is God's humanity. Jesus' humanity could have no existence apart from its union with the divine nature, while ours can and does. We are God's sons by adoption, but Jesus is God's Son by conception. Jesus' humanity has never, and could never exist as a separate "self" from God. Jesus' humanity only finds its existence within God's being. We are man existing as man, but Jesus is God existing as man. Whereas our identity is not divine, Christ's is. Whereas we are filled with the Spirit after being conceived by two human parents, Christ's human existence itself was conceived of the Holy Spirit. That is what makes Jesus, a human being, more than just a human being. No Longer the Image of God A geographical proximity of two independent natures in Christ cannot account for Jesus' humanity being the very image of God Himself (Colossians 1:15; Hebrews 1:3). Only if God actually became man, uniting Himself metaphysically with a human nature, could Jesus' humanity be said to be the image of the invisible God. An External Distinction of Existence Seeing that one cannot explain the distinctions between Father and Son by option three without de facto confessing the heresy of Nestorianism, rendering salvation impossible, and denying Jesus' essential deity, we are left only with option four. As will be demonstrated, only option four can give full justice to the distinction between Father and Son, while at the same time maintaining God's uni-personal nature, the absolute ontological deity of Christ, and the unity of His person. The "Incarnational Becoming" One of the most important Christological texts in Scripture is John 1:14, wherein John declared that the "Word became flesh" (John 1:14). To better understand the nature of the Father-Son distinction, and the need for rejecting certain conceptions of the distinction we need to have a basic understanding of the incarnational "becoming." The question at the center of the Christological dilemma is What does it mean for God to become man? How can God become man without undergoing change, or compromising the integrity of Christ's humanity? Throughout church history men have understood this incarnational becoming in several ways. Some, such as Eustathius of Antioch, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Nestorius have understood the becoming as "coming to be in" (dwell in) a man. Others, such as Arius, Eutyches, and the Kenetocists understood the becoming as "changed into" a man. Both views are soteriologically deficient, however, compromising Christ's ability to provide redemption for mankind. The first fails to ground Christ's deity in reality, while the latter fails to preserve God's immutability and/or the genuineness of Christ's humanity. Any incarnational theology must maintain that God is man, that it is God who is man, and that it is man whom God really is.18 These three Christological maxims can be expanded as follows: 1. The union of the divine and human natures must be ontological for God to be man; 2. God must be immutable for it to be God who is man; 3. The humanity God assumed must be complete and genuine for it to be man that God is.19 In order to maintain these maxims God's incarnational becoming must be of a certain sort. First, the union of the divine and human natures must be ontological, not moral/functional. A moral/functional union of the divine and human natures/wills cannot account for a true incarnation wherein God comes to be man. It can only account for God dwelling in, and working with/through a man. In such a conception of the incarnational becoming Christ's humanity always has an independent existence from deity, and we lose any foundation for declaring Christ to be God. We are left with a Nestorian Christ whose two independent natures are joined in will, but not in person. Two independent natures merely coexisting together in one geographical locale is not an incarnation of God. God did not just come to be in a man, but came to be man. The only grounds upon which God can be said to be man, and the man He became can be said to be God, is if the union is ontological. Secondly, the divine and human natures could not undergo change in the union. If God changed in the process of the incarnational becoming, it is no longer God who is man, nor man that God is.20 Any change in God's being when He became man would necessitate that God ceased being who He is, and thus the man He becomes is no longer God. Jesus would merely be the transmuted form of He who used to be God, but is now something else. To understand the incarnational becoming as God changing into man destroys the grounds upon which to claim that Jesus is God. This precludes us from understanding the becoming as a compositional union of two natures into one new nature or new being. A compositional union always requires a changing of the divine and human natures into some new nature/being, whether it be by the mixing, diminution, or obliteration of the human and/or divine natures, and therefore must be rejected. For God to be man, and for it to be man that God is requires that God be immutable. It is God's immutability that guarantees that it is God who is man, and man that God is; however, it is often assumed that God's immutability would prevent Him from becoming man in any ontological way. It is reasoned that an ontological becoming implies change, and such change is not possible if God is immutable, therefore the becoming cannot be ontological. As much as Nestorius saw the need for an ontological union of the natures to establish Christ's ontological deity, He could not conceive of such without destroying God's immutability or Christ's humanity, and therefore settled for a moral/functional union of natures/wills (an indwelling of God in man). Others, such as Eutyches and the Kenoticists, understood that the union must be ontological, so were willing to sacrifice God's immutability and the completeness of Christ's humanity to attain this.21 Still others, such as Apollinarius, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Monophysites, wanting to preserve an ontological union and God's immutability, were willing to sacrifice the completeness and/or genuineness of Christ's humanity. The first sacrificed the ontological union to preserve God's immutability and Christ's complete and genuine humanity; the second sacrificed God's immutability and Christ's complete humanity to preserve the ontological union; the third sacrificed Christ's complete and genuine humanity to preserve God's immutability and an ontological union. All three positions felt the need to sacrifice one or two of the three Christological maxims because they incorrectly understood the incarnational becoming as a compositional union of two natures into one, rather than a personal union of a human nature to God's eternal being. With this notion of "becoming" one can never maintain all three Christological maxims, and thus can never have a real incarnation of God. An ontological becoming does not require a compositional union. Neither does God's immutability prevent Him from becoming man in an ontological way, but rather guarantees that the man He becomes remains fully God, and guarantees that the humanity He assumed retains its integrity. We have established the ways in which we should not understand the incarnational becoming, but have yet to establish how we should understand it. The incarnational becoming is not a moral/functional union of two independent natures, and neither is it a compositional union of two natures into one new being, but it is God taking on a new manner of existence (a human existence), all the while continuing to exist beyond the incarnation as He always has (as God). He has come to be in a human mode of existence by metaphysically incorporating a human existence into His one divine person.22 God continues to exist as God, but also comes to exist as man with a real human psychology, and thus a real human consciousness. This personal and existential becoming no longer threatens God's immutability or the integrity of Christ's humanity, but does provide an ontological basis for God to be man, and for Jesus to be God. This will be explored in more detail in the following section. In summary, the union cannot be moral/functional because it is not sufficient to account for Jesus' ontological deity, nor a true incarnation of God into a human existence. The union cannot be compositional because a compositional union always changes, diminishes, or destroys the humanity, deity, or both. God's incarnational becoming was not God coming to be in man, or God changing into man, but God coming to exist as man, taking on a human manner23 of existence. Only such an understanding of the incarnational becoming can preserve the fullness of Christ's deity, the integrity of His humanity, and the ontological union of both. This brief discussion on the incarnational becoming is important to this discussion because it demonstrates why I believe we must explain the Father-Son distinction as an existential distinction, and not as a distinction between Christ's two natures. The tendency of Oneness theology toward the latter is, I believe, rooted in an inadequate understanding of the incarnational becoming. By elaborating on the necessary components of an incarnational theology I hope to elucidate why all explanations of the Father-Son distinction that divide up Christ's natures must be rejected. Only by understanding the incarnational becoming as a personal and existential becoming wherein God assumes a human mode of existence can we maintain the three Christological maxims, a genuine distinction between the Father and Son, and avoid splitting up the unity of Christ's person. It is to an exploration of this existential distinction that we now turn our attention. An Existential Distinction Between Father and Son Because Oneness believers recognize Jesus' deity to be that of the Father it is tempting to conclude that there is no real distinction between the Father and Son. Such a conclusion would be inaccurate, however, in light of the incarnation and hypostatic union. In the incarnation God united human nature to His divine person to personally exist as man. As man God has a theandric24 existence. The Father is the deity of the Son, but the Son has a distinct existence from the Father because "Son" speaks of God's existence as man, while "Father" speaks of the same God's continued existence beyond the incarnation. To confuse the issue of deity and existence when discussing the distinction is to confuse the entire issue. Yes, Jesus' deity is the deity of the Father, but no, Jesus does not have the same manner of existence as the Father because Jesus is God's existence as man whereas the Father is the same God's continued existence beyond the incarnation as He is in Himself. The Son is truly distinct from the Father because in the incarnation God brought human nature into metaphysical union with Himself, and began to exist as man. The union of the divine and human natures in Christ brought into being a mode of existence distinct from God's normal and continued manner of existence beyond the incarnation as the transcendent, unlimited Spirit.25 There is, then, an existential26 distinction between Jesus and the Father because of the incarnation, but not an eternal distinction within God's essence apart from, and prior to the incarnation. This distinction arises because of God's newly acquired human existence, not between Christ's deity and the deity of the Father (Trinitarianism), or between Jesus' divine and human natures (Nestorianism). God's Dual Manner of Existence While there is only one person in the Godhead, YHWH, this uni-personal God has come to exist in two ways: in the incarnation as man, and in His continued existence as God beyond the incarnation. It is the same personal God, but existing in a new way (as man). The distinction between Father and Son, then, is a distinction between God's dual manner of existence. Jesus' deity is the deity of the Father (the same "he"), but in a human mode of existence. In God's human mode of existence He has made Himself known to us as the Son; in God's continued mode of existence beyond the incarnation He has made Himself known as the Father. A Nestorian understanding of Christ, however, does not see the Father-Son distinction as a distinction in the manner of God's existence, but rather as a distinction between Christ's natures. The Father-Son distinction is not perceived as a distinction between God as He exists in Himself as God, and God as He has come to exist in the incarnation as man; the distinction, rather, is perceived to be between the God and the man in Christ, between Christ's divine and human natures. The former is a distinction of existence that is external to Christ, while the latter is a distinction between two subjects or "parts" internal to Christ. Jesus is distinct from the Father, not in the identity of His deity, but in the manner of His existence. Jesus is God's personal existence as man, while the Father is that same God's continued manner of existence beyond the incarnation. Because the distinction is bound up in the incarnation it is not eternal, and neither is it rooted in God's essential deity as in Trinitarian theology. The deity of the Son and the deity of the Father are not two distinct divine persons in the Godhead, but the same person in two distinct modes of existence.27 There is a distinction, then, between God as He exists in Himself, and as He has come to exist as man.28 The distinction is not between God and God, God and an individual man, or a divine nature and a human nature, but between God's two modes of personal existence. God's newly acquired existence as man must be distinguished from God's normal existence as He is in Himself because of the acquisition of the human nature. The acquisition of the human nature is the cause of the distinction, not the location of the distinction (as in Nestorianism). The incarnation is God's one person coming to exist in a new way. God did not change, but His personal manner of existence did. When God became a man in the incarnation He began to exist as man in addition to His existence as God. God did not come to exist as another "he," however. There was no creation of another person. Rather YHWH, the only divine "he," came to exist in another manner than He had existed for all eternity. Because God is the only personal subject in Christ, the "he" in Christ is the same "he" as the "he" of the Father, but existing in a new manner. The Father and Son, then, is the same "he," but "he" is existing in two distinct ways. As Father "he" exists as God, while as Son the same "he" has come to exist as man. After the incarnation, then, we know God in two distinct ways: beyond the incarnation as "Father," and in the incarnation as "Son." The former is beyond His human existence as God while the latter is in His human existence as genuine man. The distinction between the Father and Son could be illustrated in the following manner: Existential (External) Distinction As can be seen, it is the same personal deity in both modes of existence. The only difference is that in the Son the one uni-personal God has united to Himself a human nature to bring into being an existence which is metaphysically distinct from His continued existence beyond His incarnate state as a human being.29 This is in contrast to a Nestorian conception (option three) of Christ wherein the Father-Son distinction is made internal to Christ between His two natures. The Nestorian view could be illustrated in the following manner: Internal Distinction of Natures To make a distinction between Father and Son as an internal distinction between Christ's natures ultimately splits up Christ's person. Only an existential distinction external to Christ, between God's two modes of existence, can account for the genuineness of the Father-Son distinction, and avoid a Trinitarian and Nestorian view of Christ. God Existing as Man God's human manner of existence should not be conceived as God living in and acting through a human body. God did not merely come to be in a man, but He came to be man, and exist as man.30 When He assumed a human existence God assumed all that pertains to a human existence including a human consciousness, psyche, volition, will, etc. In His incarnate existence, then, God came to be conscious as man, and to know and act31 as man.32 He truly experienced human experiences as man, not merely in His human nature, but through His human mode of existence/consciousness. Not Akin to Trinitarianism Seeing the Father-Son distinction as an existential distinction between the uni-personal God's two modes of existence is not akin to Binitarianism or Trinitarianism. As opposed to these theologies which posit two and three persons in the Godhead respectively, the Oneness understanding admits only one divine person, but sees that one person coming to exist in two distinct ways after the incarnation. The incarnation did not create another divine person, it simply changed His manner of existence. What is being distinguished is the manner in which the one divine person has come to exist/function, not the person Himself. Distinguishing between the one God's two modes of personal existence does not make God two persons, or create another divine person out of the one, but it does give God a new manner of existence that He never experienced before the incarnation. When God became a man in the incarnation He began to exist as man in addition to His existence as God. It is the same personal God, but existing in a new way (as man). This is no different in principle from the Trinitarian teaching that the second person of the Trinity came to exist as man, and yet continued to exist as the unlimited Son beyond the incarnation without becoming two persons. Where Oneness and Trinitarian theology differ is not in our confession of a dual existence for one personal divine Being, but on the identity of that one being. Trinitarian theology maintains that Being to be the second person of a tri-personal God, whereas Oneness theology maintains that Being to be the one uni-personal God, YHWH. According to Oneness theology God's one person has come to have a dual existence in the incarnation while remaining one person, while according to Trinitarian theology it is the second of three eternal persons who has come to have a dual existence in the incarnation while remaining one person. In the same way that the Trinitarian construct does not turn God into four persons, neither does the Oneness construct turn God into two persons. Both theologies acknowledge a dual manner of existence for one person, yet do not understand such a dual manner of existence to mean that the one person has become two persons in the incarnation. It is maintained, rather, that one person has come to exist in two ways after the incarnation. Understanding the similarities between the two theologies has great apologetic value. For those Trinitarians who will wish to claim that the Oneness understanding of a single person coming to have a dual existence is nonsensical is equally applicable to Trinitarianism; and any charge that Oneness theology subtly introduces another person into the Godhead is unfounded. The following diagram serves to demonstrate how the Oneness understanding of God's one person having a dual existence is similar to the Trinitarian understanding of the one person of the Son having a dual existence, and how such a distinction does not make God multi-personal in Oneness theology: An Analogy God's dual manner of existence could be compared to a balloon and air. Air permeates our atmosphere. This could be likened to the Spirit of God who is invisible and omnipresent. Jesus could be likened to the balloon that is filled with air. The air has no shape, but when it fills the balloon, it shapes the balloon into a certain size and appearance. When we look at the balloon we are not viewing the air, but we are viewing that which contains the air. Without the balloon we would not be able to see the invisible air; and without the air the balloon would never have the shape and size that it does. Scripture tells us that Jesus is the image of the invisible God (Colossians 1:15; Hebrews 1:3). Jesus said, "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9; See also 12:45). Jesus is the face of God made known to man. Apart from the incarnation we could not see God (John 1:18; I Timoty 1:17; 6:16; Hebrews 11:27; I John 4:12). We might call the balloon the incarnation of the air. Just as the air in the balloon continues to exist beyond the balloon, so likewise the Spirit of God continues to exist beyond the incarnation as the omnipresent Spirit.33 God did not cease inhabiting the heavens when He became man. He exists both in the balloon, and beyond the balloon if you will. As the air has a dual manner of existence both in the balloon and beyond the balloon, so God came to exist as man in the incarnation while continuing to exist as He always had beyond the incarnation (as God). As the air in the balloon is no different from the air outside the balloon, even so the deity of Christ is the same deity as the Father. We are not talking about two distinct divine identities, but two distinct modes of existence of one divine person. Even with the recognition that the air in the balloon is the same as the air that continues to exist beyond the balloon we would not call the balloon the "air," nor would we refer to the air outside of the balloon as the "balloon" because we recognize that in each case the air is existing in a different manner. We realize that the material object (balloon) filled with air is distinct from the air itself, although the same air fills both the balloon and the atmosphere. In the same manner we should not call the Father "Son," nor the Son "Father," for in doing so we confuse God's personal manner of existence as God with God's personal manner of existence as man. Did God Change in the Incarnation? If God comes to exist in a new manner at the incarnation, does this mean that God has changed?34 We must confess that God is immutable in His essence, and unable of change.35 God's immutability, however, does not prevent Him from becoming man and taking up a human existence. It is God's immutability that guarantees that in the incarnation it is truly God who is man. If God would have changed in the incarnation we could not make this confession, for God would have ceased to be God in the process. The incarnation was not God changing into a man and ceasing to be who He was in Himself. The incarnation, rather, is God coming to be man. It is God coming to exist in a new manner while continuing to exist in Himself as He always has. Surely God did not have to sacrifice His deity to become man; He merely incorporated a human existence into His one divine person. While God's divine essence is unable of change, there has been a change in God's experience in the incarnation.36 God did not give up anything of what He is, but rather added to His existence something that He was previously not (Philippians 2:7; Hebrews 2:14, 16; Colossians 2:9), and came to experience something He had not previously experienced. God remained what He was but assumed what He was not. As Origen said, "He … became a man, and was incarnate although God, and while made a man remained the God which He was."37 The incarnation changed the manner of God's personal existence, but not God's person.38 God has come to exist and experience as man, yet continues to exist beyond the incarnation as He has always existed in Himself. God can have experiences, and experiences change, but the one experiencing the experiences does not change in essence. How an Existential Distinction Between Father and Son is Distinguished from a Trinitarian Distinction of Persons Oneness believers have tended to fear any sort of distinction as it is applied to Father and Son because Trinitarians have so distinguished between Father and Son so as to endanger God's oneness. The distinction being made here, however, is not comparable to the Trinitarian concept of the distinction for the following reasons: 1. Trinitarianism teaches three eternal distinctions of persons within the one essence of the Godhead. Oneness theology, however, only admits to an ontological distinction between the Father and Son, not between the Father, Son, and Spirit, and this distinction is neither personal nor eternal. 2. Whereas in Trinitarian theology the Father-Son distinction is between one divine person and another divine person, in Oneness theology the distinction is between the one uni-personal God's existence beyond the incarnation, and the same uni-personal God's existence as man in the incarnation. 3. The Oneness understanding of the distinction between Father and Son is not an eternal distinction of persons prior to the incarnation. Oneness theology understands the distinction as arising only after the incarnation when the one uni-personal God, YHWH, Himself became a man, acquiring a genuine human existence/consciousness. Whereas the Trinitarian distinction is eternal and unrelated to the incarnation, in Oneness theology the distinction is temporal39 and exclusively bound up in the incarnation. In light of the above, to confess a distinction of existence between the Father and Son is not a Trinitarian confession of an internal division of persons within God's nature. Rather, it is a recognition that when God took to Himself a human existence, a genuine distinction between the Father and Son arose. While we must reject an eternal, personal distinction within God's very essence, we cannot reject the genuine distinction between Father and Son that arose because of the incarnation, distinguishing God's existence beyond the incarnation from God's existence in the incarnation. Conclusion We ought to learn from the mistakes of both Modalism and Trinitarianism not to emphasize either the oneness or distinction passages to such an extent as to ignore or redefine the other. Neither let us make the mistake made by the Modalists who saw any recognition of a true distinction between Father and Son as an attack on God's oneness. We must confess a true distinction in light of the Biblical data, but must seek to understand where such a distinction resides. We cannot understand the distinction between Father and Son to reside between Christ's divine and human natures, for such destroys the unity of His person (Nestorianism), denies the very grounds upon which our redemption was accomplished, and denies Jesus' essential deity, all of which are not congruent with Oneness theology. The only way to confess God's uni-personal nature, a real distinction between the Father and Son, the deity of Christ, the unity of Christ's person, and the reality of our redemption is to understand the distinction between Father and Son to be an external, incarnational distinction between the one God's incarnate existence as man, and that same God's continued existence beyond the incarnation as He exists in Himself. Only an incarnational, metaphysical, and existential distinction between the Father and Son is congruent with the basic tenants of Oneness theology. While the notion of an eternal distinction within God's eternal essence should be rejected (Trinitarianism), we cannot reject an existential distinction between the Father and Son that arose in the incarnation when God assumed a human existence (Oneness theology). Such a recognition does not make Jesus another person in the Godhead, but it does give full weight to His genuine human existence which was distinct from God's continued existence beyond the incarnation, and thus apart from a genuine human consciousness. With such an understanding we can adequately explain the reason for the NT distinction between Father and Son, and at the same time maintain God's uni-personal nature. Appendix I Son There really are not too many options when it comes to understanding "Father" and "Son." We could say that "Son" refers only to Jesus' human nature, and "Father" to Jesus' divine nature, but such an explanation assumes an unbiblical definition of "Son," and separates Jesus' natures (Nestorian), thus effectively destroying the unity of His person. The appellation, "Son," certainly originated with the incarnation, but it cannot be "assigned" to either Jesus' human nature or divine nature. "Son" refers to Jesus' whole person, both deity and humanity united in one existence. While "Son" refers to more than Jesus' human nature, it is not appropriate to apply the term to God apart from the incarnation in Christ. "Son" is a relational term arising only in the incarnation, emphasizing the humanity emerging in the incarnation, but at the same time not excluding the divine nature. "Son" never refers to the incorporeal Spirit alone apart from referencing the humanity of Christ. Oneness believers are against the term "God the Son" because it equates the word "Son" with deity alone, for which there is no Biblical support. "Son" emphasizes the humanity God assumed in the incarnation, but does not exclude Jesus' deity from this reference. Only the whole person of Christ, both deity and humanity, can rightly be called the Son. That "Son" cannot attributed purely to Christ's humanity is evidenced by the fact that Hebrews 1:8-9 connects "Son" with "God," saying, "But unto the Son He says, 'Your throne, O God...'." If Son referred only to Christ's human nature, such a statement would be meaningless. Clearly the author of Hebrews is attributing deity to Son. Another example is found in Matthew 16:16-17 when it is revealed to Peter that Jesus is the Son of God. If "Son of God" only refers to Jesus' humanity, no revelation from the Father would have been necessary. Anybody could have seen that Jesus was a human being by just looking at Him. Even the unbelieving Jews understood Him to be a genuine human being. It is what the Jews could not believe, that Peter understood by the revelation of God; i.e. Jesus was divine, being both God and man simultaneously. While it is tempting to fragment Jesus into a divine side and a human side, and then reason that since Jesus' deity is the Father only His humanity is the Son, the hypostatic union demands that we understand the Son to be one indivisible person. His two natures cannot be understood to be individual entities able to be viewed separately from one another and labeled by two separate names, but two natures unified in one indivisible person. When we are talking about the Son, then, we are talking about deity and humanity united in one ontological reality. Appendix II The Biblical Use of "Father" and "Son" In light of the distinction arising in the incarnation we cannot use the terms "Father" and "Son" interchangeably. While it is true that the Father and Son are the same personal deity, and not two distinct persons within God, it is not true that "Father" and "Son" are synonymous referents. Biblically speaking "Son" refers to God's existence in the incarnation, while "Father" refers to God's existence beyond the incarnation. The Father-Son distinction is not indicative of two distinct persons in the Godhead, nor is it indicative of an internal distinction between Christ's two natures, but of the one uni-personal God's two modes of existence: as God, as man. To erase the distinction of terms simply because we understand Jesus' deity to be the same as the Father's is to disrespect God's revelation, and to obliterate the distinction between God's existence as man, and His continued existence beyond the incarnation as God. The deity of the Son is known as "YHWH" before the incarnation, and "Son" only after the incarnation for the purpose of distinguishing God's new existence as a human being from God's continued existence beyond humanity. In the incarnation "Son" and "Father" are relational terms used to describe the temporal40 relationship between God as He exists beyond the incarnation, and God's limited existence as a genuine human being with a genuine human consciousness. It cannot be said that the Son is the Father, or that the Father is the Son because the Son is by definition both divine and human, while the Father is only divine. Although the deity of the Son is of the same essence as that of the Father, the deity of the Son is inextricably joined with the humanity to form an existence distinct from God's existence as transcendent Spirit. The deity of the Father is in the Son, but the Son's existence is different from the Father's. There is, therefore, a distinction between the Son and the Father, but there is no separation. While we understand the Scripture to teach that the deity of Jesus is the deity of the Father, this does not mean that we should call Jesus "the Father." We can recognize His deity to be that of the Father, but nevertheless, because His identity goes beyond that of the Father in the hypostatic union, and due to the fact that His human existence was fathered by God's Spirit, He is called the "Son of God, Jesus Christ." Jesus' identity may include the deity of the Father, but we do the Scripture an injustice when we insist on saying that Jesus' name is "Father." Jesus' name is "Jesus," not "Father." "Jesus" and "Son of God" are terms incorporating Jesus' existence as deity and humanity perfectly united in one theandric existence. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes 1. Meaning 'the qualities and attributes that make a thing what it is.' 2. My comments in regards to Modalistic theology are broad in scope, meant to represent the broader theology of the Modalists, not the theology of any particular individual Modalist theologian such as Praxeas, Noetus, or Sabellius. I realize that each of these theologians had their own unique contribution to Modalistic theology, but I am seeking to bring out the common approach and presuppositions underlying them all. It should also be noted that it is difficult to determine the exact theology of the Modalists because their writings/beliefs have only survived within the writings of those who disagreed with them. We cannot be sure how accurately the church fathers understood and/or conveyed the Modalists' theological perspective. 3. And/or also by alleging that "Son" referred only to Jesus' humanity, while "Father" referred to Jesus' deity. Such a use of the Biblical terms is inaccurate. See Appendix I and II for a fuller discussion on the proper use of "Son" and "Father." 4. I use "Trinitarians" loosely here, realizing that the doctrine of the Trinity had not yet fully developed when the church fathers, such as Tertullian and Hippolytus, made their evaluation of Modalistic Monarchianism. 5. While I find error in both Trinitarian and Modalistic theologies, I do not find them equally in error. I believe the Modalists were closer to the Biblical truth than were the Trinitarians, however, in saying that they were "closer" I am acknowledging that they did not make it all the way, and thus are not above critique. I find great affinity with Modalistic Monarchianism, but I wish to point out its shortcomings so that we may avoid them in the development of our own Christology and theology proper. 6. As was stated previously, they also resorted to a Nestorian view of Christ wherein "Son" was understood to apply only to Jesus' human nature, while "Father" applied to Jesus' divine nature. 7. When we have made a referential distinction between Father and Son, it has typically followed the Modalistic explanation wherein "Son" is said to refer to Jesus' human nature, while "Father" refers to His divine nature. See Appendix I for the proper use of "Son." 8. This is just one of the ways in which Oneness believers have allowed Trinitarianism to shape our understanding of God, rather than Scripture. Too often we will over-emphasize a Biblical teaching to disassociate ourselves from a Trinitarian teaching, or under-emphasize a Biblical teaching for fear of its association with Trinitarianism. Both cause us to postulate a reactionary theology, rather than a Biblical theology. This is not to say that theology can be done in a vacuum, or that we should not emphasize certain Biblical teachings in reaction to errors that creep into the church, but it is to say that we must not let those errors cause us to distort or ignore facets of the Biblical teaching for fear of "sounding Trinitarian." 9. This is evidenced by our traditional use of "Son" to refer strictly to Jesus' human nature, and not to Jesus' whole person, both deity and humanity united in one existence. See Appendix I for more information on why we must reject the teaching that "Son" applies only to Jesus' human nature. 10. It should be made clear that I am in no wise claiming to be the only Oneness theologian who is not Nestorian, or that my Christology is unique among Oneness believers. There are other Oneness theologians who are expressing sentiments similar to those expressed in this paper. I have purposely failed to cite them, just as I have purposely failed to cite those whose Christology is inherently Nestorian. This paper is intended to be a reflection on my studies, not an evaluation of any particular individual's Christology. 11. Metaphysics pertain to reality which is beyond material form and substance; i.e. immaterial substance. 12. Meaning 'capable of bringing about the desired result.' 13. Yes, it is true that Christ has both a divine and human nature, but His human nature is not a distinct human person. There is only one person in Christ, God, and that one person merely incorporated a human nature/existence into His one divine person. God came to exist as man by assuming human nature into His divine person, not be uniting Himself to an existing human individual person. 14. Ontology is a branch of philosophy pertaining to the nature and essence of being. Its meaning is nearly synonymous with "metaphysical." 15. The Scripture speaks of God dwelling in Christ, and the Father being in Christ (John 10:38; 14:10-11; 17:21; II Corinthians 5:19; I Timothy 3:16), so by no means am I condemning the use of such language. To do so would put me in conflict with Scripture. What I am condemning is an illegitimate understanding of these Biblical statements. When the Scripture speaks of God being in Christ it is not suggesting a Nestorian Christ wherein God only occupies "space" in the man Jesus, without any essential union of Jesus' humanity and deity. The Scripture balances such statements when it says the Word became flesh (John 1:1, 14). While "in" could be interpreted to mean a moral/functional union, "become" implies something greater; i.e. an ontological union. We must understand the former in light of the latter. When the Scripture speaks of the Father as being "in Christ," it is not attempting to explain the metaphysical realities of Christ's person, but rather the functional reality of the incarnation. It is a simple way of expressing the truth that God was working in and through Christ, because Christ's humanity was God's humanity by virtue of the incarnational becoming and hypostatic union. Jesus was God's existence as a human being. It may be said that God was in Christ, but He was not merely in Christ. Particular attention should be given to John 1:14 because some place the emphasis on "dwell" rather than "become," maintaining that "dwell" describes the manner in which God became flesh. The incarnation, then, is understood merely as God dwelling in, or tabernacling in a man. This, of course, would negate understanding the incarnational becoming in a metaphysical way. Grammatically the Word did two things: He "became" and "dwelt," in that order. Once the Word became flesh, He then lived among us as man. "Dwell," does not describe how the Word became flesh, but describes what the Word did after He became flesh, namely He lived among men. 16. Meaning 'the appearance of reality according to human perception.' 17. Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Change?: The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation, Studies in Historical Theology, Vol. IV (Still River, MA: St. Bede's Publications, 1985), 37, 50. 18. Weinandy, 82. 19. Ibid., 186-7. 20. Ibid., 115. 21. Not all Kenoticists would fall into this camp. Thomasius and Charles Gore, for example, denied immutability but confessed a relatively complete and genuine humanity. They declared that God emptied Himself of His relative attributes (the omnis), but not His essential attributes (love, justice, holiness, etc.). Others, such as Weston did not deny God's immutability, but did seem to deny the genuineness of Christ's humanity by alleging that God merely exercised self-restraint of His divine attributes to the level that the humanity had the capacity to mediate. In this line of reasoning Jesus' consciousness is essentially a truncated divine consciousness, tailored to a human level, not a human consciousness. Denying Jesus a genuine human psychology mitigates His genuine humanity. It is also difficult to put Kenoticism into one camp because many Kenoticists seem to deny Christ's complete deity and confess His complete humanity prior to Christ's glorification, but then affirm His complete deity and deny His complete humanity after His glorification, seeing a full restoration of His deity and a deification of His humanity upon glorification. So whether it be before or after Christ's glorification, Kenoticists tend to deny God's immutability and genuine humanity at one point or another. 22. God's immutability guarantees that in this union the unique properties of the human and divine natures are fully preserved. 23. Some may misunderstand the terminology, "manner of existence," thinking it implies a denial of the genuineness or completeness of Christ's humanity. I wish to make it clear that no such thing is being implied by my usage of this terminology. When I say "manner of existence," the genuineness of the existence is not being described or questioned, but rather the type of existence. If I asked, What is your manner of traveling?, it would be understood that I was questioning the way in which they were traveling, not the genuineness of their traveling. The traveling is genuine, but there are different ways to travel. The same applies to existence. Existence is genuine, but there are different types of existence. There is a human way of existing, and a divine way of existing. God exists in a divine way, while humans exist in a human way. Typically things always exist as what they are. If you are a duck, then you exist in a "duckly" manner. If you are a man, you exist in a humanly manner. But when we come to the incarnation we are confronted with something entirely different. Here is something, God, that comes to exist in a way that is "out of His league" so to speak. We cannot look at the subject and automatically assume His way of existing, because never before in history has a divine subject ever existed as anything other than a divine being in a divine way. But in the incarnation the divine subject comes to exist as man while continuing to exist according to His "normal" way of existence. The terminology may sound so strange because the situation is so strange. The incarnation is the only example I know where a particular identity exists in a way that is different than their identity. How is it that God can be man? The world has never heard of such a thing. The only thing I can compare it to is the caterpillar, but even this is an imperfect analogy. A caterpillar starts off as a caterpillar, but eventually becomes a butterfly. The identity of this insect is that of a caterpillar, but in the process of time it comes to exist as a butterfly. Did the personal identity of that caterpillar change? No. It is the same thing, the same "thinking" substance. What changed? What changed is the way (manner) in which that butterfly exists. It now exists in a different manner than before. It could be said, then, that the butterfly is the caterpillar's "butterflyly" manner of existence. And when I say that the caterpillar is "existing as a butterfly," in no way would such a statement imply that the butterfly is not a genuine butterfly. The subject stays the same-the butterfly-but the way in which that butterfly has come to exist has changed. Now of course God did not cease existing as God in order to exist as man, and that is where the analogy breaks down. The analogy only serves to show how one subject can come to exist in a new manner while still retaining their personal identity. 24. Coming from the Greek theos (God) and anthropos (man). 25. The union of the divine and human natures in Christ should not be conceived as a blending or mixing of deity and humanity into one composite being that is neither fully God nor fully man (tertium quid, or "third something"). The incarnational becoming (John 1:14) is God taking on a new manner of existence, yet remaining both fully God and fully man in the process. If deity and humanity formed a new substance in the union it could not be said that it is God who is truly man, or that it is truly man that God became. 26. I use "existential" as an adjective for "existence," meaning 'pertaining to existence.' It should not be confused with existential philosophy, or be understood to have any affinity with an existential understanding of God or Christology. 27. I use "mode" hesitantly because of its negative associations. It is often perceived to mean a fictitious role God plays in the incarnation that He will one day stop playing after the purpose of the incarnation has been accomplished. The Son is not a temporary role God played to be discarded in the future. The Son is a genuine human being, a real ontological being, and like all other genuine human beings will live for eternity as a human being. Jesus' humanity is no mask that is discardable when the drama of human redemption has been accomplished. I use "mode" to mean "an ontological manner of existence--the manner in which an underlying substance is manifested," not a role or nominal device with no real ontological reference. It should also be made clear that my application of "mode" to God differs from the way Oneness believers have traditionally applied the term. Oneness theology has traditionally taught that God exists in three "modes" (Father, Son, Holy Spirit). I, however, only confess two modes of existence (Father, Son). I do not believe we can rightly claim the Spirit as a mode of God's existence. God is Spirit. "Holy Spirit" describes God's identity and nature, referring to His innermost essence. We cannot make anymore distinction between God and His Spirit as we can between our self and our spirit (I Corinthians 2:10-11). Just as my spirit is not a mode of my existence, but an aspect of my being, neither is the Holy Spirit a mode of God's existence, but is the aspect or nature or His being. We can make a true distinction, however, between God's manner/mode of existence as a genuine man, and His continued manner/mode of existence beyond the incarnation as the transcendent divine Spirit. There is a true ontological distinction between these two modes of existence because of the humanity God assumed in the incarnation. Confessing a duality of modes between Father and Son is not a fictitious distinction of (successive) roles God plays, but a reality of something God has truly become and will forever remain. 28. Weinandy, 42-43. 29. This diagram of the Son should not be understood to mean that God merely dwelt in Christ like a person dwells in a house. While God was in Christ, the union of the divine and human natures surpasses that of mere indwelling. There was a metaphysical union of the divine and human natures to form one theandric existence; a union that preserved the properties of each nature, yet united them into one person. The metaphysical union is expressed in the diagram by the absence of the black line around the yellow circle (God). 30. Weinandy, 171. 31. I do not use "act" or "acting" in the sense of "pretending," but in the sense of performing "actions" (speaking, healing, praying, sleeping, eating, teaching, etc.). 32. The incarnation should not be conceived as God knowing and acting as God, but as God knowing and acting as man by virtue of His acquisition of a human existence/consciousness. To say that God as God knows and acts in Christ is to deny Christ a truly human consciousness, rendering many passages of Scripture meaningless, such as those that speak of Jesus as growing in wisdom and lacking in knowledge. Only if God was consciously existing as man in the incarnation could we make sense of such human limitations as applied to Christ (at least without resorting to Nestorianism). To claim that Jesus' consciousness is divine rather than human rings of the ancient Apollinarian heresy wherein Christ is devoid of a human psyche and personality. If God as God is merely acting through an empty human vessel with no real human mind/consciousness, then Jesus is nothing more than a mindless bag of flesh, animated and controlled by the divine mind, not a genuine human being. And if God is conscious as God in Christ, then we must also conclude that Jesus' prayers were nothing more than God praying to Himself, because the one praying and the one being prayed to are the same person. Unless we are willing to diagnose God with divine schizophrenia and deny the integrity of Christ's humanity, we must acknowledge Jesus' consciousness as human. Only with a genuine human consciousness would Christ truly have need for prayer, and be able to have a genuine relationship with the Father. 33. All analogies break down at one point or another, this one being no exception. Explaining the incarnation as air filling a balloon could be taken in a Nestorian or Apollinarian sense inferring that God merely dwelt in human man/body. This is by no means being inferred here. The analogy is also inaccurate in another area. It is obvious that all of the air cannot be both in the balloon and continue to exist beyond the balloon at the same time, but with Christ we know that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Him bodily and yet God also continues to exist beyond the incarnation in His fullness. See my article entitled "How Can God's Fullness 'Fit' in Such a Tiny Place as Christ?" 34. This issue of God changing in the incarnation is not unique to Oneness theology. It confronts Oneness and Trinitarian theology alike because both confess a true incarnation of God into a human existence. The question is how God could become man without experiencing change, no matter if the God who became man is the second person of a tri-personal God, or the uni-personal God of Oneness theology. 35. When the Bible speaks of God being unchanging or immutable, it is in reference to His character or faithfulness, not His ability to experience anything new. It also implies the fact that God can never cease to be what He is. 36. How could it be that God could become incarnate as man without something changing? We must admit that something is different after the incarnation from what it was before the incarnation. If we say that there really was not anything new or different, then we are forced to concede that God has always been incarnate, or to deny the reality of the incarnation altogether. If we interpret anything "new" for God to mean that God changes (such as a new manner of existence as man) then most assuredly God could not have become incarnate. A true incarnation of God demands that we assume something is different for God after the incarnation than it was before the incarnation. Because we realize that God must remain God in the incarnation, we understand that the incarnation involved a change in God's manner of existence, and thus in His experience, but not in His essential nature as God. This recognizes that something changed when God became incarnate, without at the same time confessing that God Himself changed in Himself. 37. Origen First Principles, preface iv; available from http://www.ccel.org/fathers2/ANF-04/anf04-44.htm#P6205_1085826; Internet; accessed 4 April 2002. 39. Weinandy, 54. 39. Not to be confused with "temporary." 40. Not to be confused with "temporary."