Whenever you find yourself thinking, or hear others claiming, that he is exaggerating, that is our innate tendency to reach for a rationalization. This will happen often: humans seem to have evolved to practice denial when confronted publicly with the unacceptable. Back in the 1930s, The New York Times assured its readers that Hitler’s anti-Semitism was all posture. More recently, the same newspaper made a telling choice between two statements made by Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov following a police crackdown on protesters in Moscow: “The police acted mildly—I would have liked them to act more harshly” rather than those protesters’ “liver should have been spread all over the pavement.”

Perhaps the journalists could not believe their ears. But they should—both in the Russian case, and in the American one. For all the admiration Trump has expressed for Putin, the two men are very different; if anything, there is even more reason to listen to everything Trump has said. He has no political establishment into which to fold himself following the campaign, and therefore no reason to shed his campaign rhetoric. On the contrary: it is now the establishment that is rushing to accommodate him—from the president, who met with him at the White House on Thursday, to the leaders of the Republican Party, who are discarding their long-held scruples to embrace his radical positions.

He has received the support he needed to win, and the adulation he craves, precisely because of his outrageous threats. Trump rally crowds have chanted “Lock her up!” They, and he, meant every word. If Trump does not go after Hillary Clinton on his first day in office, if he instead focuses, as his acceptance speech indicated he might, on the unifying project of investing in infrastructure (which, not coincidentally, would provide an instant opportunity to reward his cronies and himself), it will be foolish to breathe a sigh of relief. Trump has made his plans clear, and he has made a compact with his voters to carry them out. These plans include not only dismantling legislation such as Obamacare but also doing away with judicial restraint—and, yes, punishing opponents.

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What leads to the rise of the rule of law in authoritarian regimes? Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? Based on an in-depth case study on contemporary China, Yuhua Wang provides a concise answer to the questions—the demand of politically disconnected interest groups drives authoritarian rule of law. With quantitative and qualitative data analysis, Tying the Autocrat’s Hands unfolds a bargaining process between authoritarian rulers and interest groups, and presents in detail the political economy and legal institutions in China.

Challenging the conventional wisdom that the rule of law restricts power of the state and is therefore not promoted by authoritarian rulers, Wang contends that under certain conditions the rule of law is in the interests of authoritarian regimes. Rulers need cooperation from interest groups that control valuable assets to stay in power, and will thus respect the rule of law when these asset holders demand for it. Grounded on such assumption, Wang proposes a demand-side theory: interest groups that lack political connection, namely, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), enhance law enforcement in China. Compared to state-owned enterprises, domestic private enterprises, and foreign enterprises owned by ethnic Chinese, the non-Chinese FIEs have less access to informal institutions such as personal network with local officials. More often they resort to formal legal institutions to protect their rights, and therefore have a greater demand for judicial efficiency and fairness. Local governments in regions with higher level of FIE presence are thus more likely to respect laws in order to protect these firms and encourage them to generate higher local GDP.

To test this demand-side theory, Wang conducts a cross-regional, within-country comparison using four nationwide survey data sets ranging from 1995 to 2006, and shows a few important associations from the regression results. First, FIEs outside the China circle (i.e., not from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macau) are less likely to bribe than any other type of firms. Second, regions with more foreign capital have less corruption in the commercial realm (but not in other realms). Third, the level of FDI (foreign direct investment) from outside the China circle is [End Page 210] positively associated with the provincial government’s financial support for courts. These results confirm the hypotheses that (1) FIEs are less likely to use informal institutions to protect their rights, (2) the presence of FIEs improves law enforcement, and (3) in regions with more FIEs, governments are more likely to support the rule of law.

A major contribution of the book is that it enriches our understanding of China’s constitutional and legal system, and raises issues of critical importance to both scholars and policy makers. In China, behaviors of judicial organs are not only shaped by power relations among various actors, but also embedded in the indigenous political-economic context. As Wang points out sharply in the third chapter, China’s courts lack independency. Courts’ funding comes from the government budget, and its personnel appointment is greatly affected by the decision of the party committee. These institutional constraints to a large extent limit the power of the courts. As a result, the efficiency and fairness of legal institutions becomes a function of the interests of local governments and enterprises. Wang also underscores the high degree of decentralization and local autonomy in China. The same legal institution is performed rather distinctively at different local levels. For instance, some municipal governments allocate funding to courts timely and sufficiently, thereby generating a higher level of judicial efficiency, whereas others do not and the courts cannot function well as a result of funding shortages.