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Luis Miguel Goitizolo

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RE: ARE WE NOW IN THE END TIMES?
10/24/2016 2:32:21 PM

Turkey’s New Maps Are Reclaiming the Ottoman Empire

In the past few weeks, a conflict between Ankara and Baghdad over Turkey’s role in the liberation of Mosul has precipitated an alarming burst of Turkish irredentism. On two separate occasions, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the Treaty of Lausanne, which created the borders of modern Turkey, for leaving the country too small. He spoke of the country’s interest in the fate of Turkish minorities living beyond these borders, as well as its historic claims to the Iraqi city of Mosul, near which Turkey has a small military base. And, alongside news of Turkish jets bombing Kurdish forces in Syria and engaging in mock dogfights with Greek planes over the Aegean Sea, Turkey’s pro-government media have shown a newfound interest in a series of imprecise, even crudely drawn, maps of Turkey with new and improved borders.

Turkey won’t be annexing part of Iraq anytime soon, but this combination of irredentist cartography and rhetoric nonetheless offers some insight into Turkey’s current foreign and domestic policies and Ankara’s self-image. The maps, in particular, reveal the continued relevance of Turkish nationalism, a long-standing element of the country’s statecraft, now reinvigorated with some revised history and an added dose of religion. But if the past is any indication, the military interventions and confrontational rhetoric this nationalism inspires may worsen Turkey’s security and regional standing.

At first glance, the maps of Turkey appearing on Turkish TV recently resemble similar irredentist maps put out by proponents of greater Greece, greater Macedonia, greater Bulgaria, greater Armenia, greater Azerbaijan, and greater Syria. That is to say, they aren’t maps of the Ottoman Empire, which was substantially larger, or the entire Muslim world or the Turkic world. They are maps of Turkey, just a little bigger.



misaki-milli-nedir

But the specific history behind the borders they envision provides the first indication of what’s new and what isn’t about Erdogan’s brand of nationalism. These maps purport to show the borders laid out in Turkey’s National Pact, a document Erdogan recently suggested the prime minister of Iraq should read to understand his country’s interest in Mosul. Signed in 1920, after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I, the National Pact identified those parts of the empire that the government was prepared to fight for. Specifically, it claimed those territories that were still held by the Ottoman army in October 1918 when Constantinople signed an armistice with the allied powers. On Turkey’s southern border, this line ran from north of Aleppo in what is now Syria to Kirkuk in what is now Iraq.

When the allies made it clear they planned to leave the empire with a lot less than it held in 1918, it led to renewed fighting in which troops under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk defeated European forces to establish Turkey as it exists today. For the better part of the past century, Turkey’s official history lauded Ataturk for essentially realizing the borders envisioned by the National Pact (minus Mosul, of course), as recognized with the Treaty of Lausanne. It was an exaggerated claim, given the parts of the pact that were left out, but also an eminently practical one, intended to prevent a new and precarious Turkish republic from losing what it had achieved in pursuit of unrealistic territorial ambitions. Indeed, while countries like Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary brought disaster on themselves by trying to forcibly rewrite their postwar borders, Turkey — under Ataturk and his successor — wisely resisted this urge.

Erdogan, by contrast, has given voice to an alternative narrative in which Ataturk’s willingness in the Treaty of Lausanne to abandon territories such as Mosul and the now-Greek islands in the Aegean was not an act of eminent pragmatism but rather a betrayal. The suggestion, against all evidence, is that better statesmen, or perhaps a more patriotic one, could have gotten more.

Among other things, Erdogan’s reinterpretation of history shows the ironies behind the widespread talk in the United States of his supposed “neo-Ottomanism.” A decade ago, Erdogan’s enthusiasm for all things Ottoman appeared to be part of an effective strategy for improving relations with the Muslim Middle East, a policy that some U.S. critics saw as a challenge to their country’s role in the region. But refashioning the National Pact as a justification for irredentism rather than a rebuke of it has not been popular among Turkey’s neighbors. Criticism of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy is now as likely to come from the Arab world as anywhere else.

Erdogan’s use of the National Pact also demonstrates how successfully Turkey’s Islamists have reappropriated, rather than rejected, elements of the country’s secular nationalist historical narrative. Government rhetoric has been quick to invoke the heroism of Turkey’s war of independence in describing the popular resistance to the country’s July 15 coup attempt. And alongside the Ottomans, Erdogan routinely references the Seljuks, a Turkic group that preceded the Ottomans in the Middle East by several centuries, and even found a place for more obscure pre-Islamic Turkic peoples like the Gokturks, Avars, and Karakhanids that first gained fame in Ataturk’s 1930s propaganda.

Similarly, in Syria and Iraq, Erdogan is aiming to achieve a long-standing national goal, the defeat of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), by building on the traditional nationalist tools of Turkish foreign policy — namely, the leveraging of Turkish minorities in neighboring countries. The Sultan Murad Brigade, comprising predominantly ethnic Turkmens, has been one of Ankara’s military assets inside Syria against both Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the PKK. Meanwhile, the Turkmen population living around Mosul and its surrounding area has been a concern and an asset for Ankara in Iraq. Turkish special forces have worked with the Iraqi Turkmen Front since at least 2003 in order to expand Turkish influence and counter the PKK in northern Iraq.

Over the past century, the Turkish minorities in northern Greece and Cyprus have played a similar role. That is, their well-being has been a subject of genuine concern for Turkish nationalists but also a potential point of leverage with Athens to be used as needed. (Greece, of course, has behaved similarly with regard to the Greek minority in Turkey. Not surprisingly, both populations have often suffered reciprocally as a result.) In the case of Cyprus, for example, Turkey’s 1974 invasion was as much about defending its strategic position as it was about protecting the island’s Turkish community. Following his statements about Lausanne, Erdogan further upset Greece by stating, “Turkey cannot disregard its kinsmen in Western Thrace, Cyprus, Crimea, and anywhere else.” Yet Athens might take comfort from the case of the Crimean Tatars, which reveals the extent to which geopolitics can lead Turkey to do just this: Although Ankara raised concerns over the status of the Crimean Tatars after Russia seized the peninsula, it seems to have subsequently concluded that improved relations with Moscow take precedence over ethnic affinities.

But Erdogan has also emphasized a new element to Turkey’s communitarian foreign-policy agenda: Sunni sectarianism. In speaking about Mosul, he recently declared that Turkey would not betray its “Turkmen brothers” or its “Sunni Arab brothers.” Like secular Turkish nationalism, this strain of Sunni sectarianism has an undeniable domestic appeal, and Erdogan has shown it can also be invoked selectively in keeping with Turkey’s foreign-policy needs. Erdogan’s new sectarianism is evident in Mosul, where Turkey has warned of the risks to Sunnis should Shiite militias take control of the city. But the policy’s influence is clearest in Syria, where Turkey has been supporting Sunni rebels aiming to topple the Assad regime (including those now struggling to hold the city of Aleppo). In both Iraq and Syria, however, Turkey’s sectarianism has not been allowed to trump pragmatism. Ankara has been keen to maintain a mutually beneficial economic relationship with Iran despite backing opposite sides in Syria and in the past year has also expressed its willingness to make peace with Assad if circumstances require it.

More broadly, Turkey’s current interventionism in Syria and Iraq fits within an established pattern. Not only do countries regularly find themselves sucked into civil wars on their doorstep, but the points at which Turkey has proved susceptible to irredentism in the past have all come at moments of change and uncertainty similar to what the Middle East is experiencing today. In 1939, Ankara annexed the province of Hatay, then under French control, by taking advantage of the crisis in Europe on the eve of World War II. Then, after that war, Syria’s newfound independence prompted some in the Turkish media to cast a glance at Aleppo, and the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands from Italy to Greece also piqued some interest in acquiring them for Turkey. Similarly, Ankara paidlittle attention to Cyprus when it was firmly under British control, but when talk of the island’s independence began, Turkey started to show its concern. Subsequently, it was only when it appeared Greece might annex the island that Turkey invaded to prevent this change in the status quo. In this light, Turkey’s recent rhetoric is perhaps less surprising following several years in which events and commentators have repeatedly suggested that the entire political order of the modern Middle East is crumbling.

More specifically, though, Turkish policy in the Middle East is driven by an urgent concern stemming from its conflict with the PKK, which has been exacerbated by the group’s gains in northern Syria. The PKK has long shaped Turkey’s relations with its southeastern neighbors. Most notably, Turkey nearly invaded Syria in 1998 in an ultimately successful effort to force Damascus to stop sheltering the group’s leader. Similarly, Turkey has kept military forces in the area of Mosul for the better part of two decades, in order to conduct operations against the PKK. Ankara has always portrayed this intervention, with little controversy in Turkey, as a matter of national security and self-defense. Today, self-defense remains Turkey’s main justification for its activities in Iraq, with Erdogan repeatedly emphasizing that the presence of Turkish forces there “acts as insurance against terrorist attacks targeting Turkey.” As long as the PKK maintains an open presence in Iraq, this is also the most compelling justification, domestically and internationally, for military involvement beyond its borders.

Indeed, to all the specific ethnic, sectarian, and historical rationales he has offered for Turkey’s interest in Mosul, Erdogan has been quick to attach one additional argument: The United States and Russia continue to play an outsized role in the region despite lacking any of these connections to it. Erdogan noted that some countries were telling Turkey, which shares a 220-mile border with Iraq, to stay out. Yet, despite not having history in the region or connection to it, these same countries were “coming and going.” “Did Saddam [Hussein] tell the United States to come to Iraq 14 years ago?” he added.

Behind the history, in other words, Ankara is all too aware of the fact that the power to do so remains the only rationale for foreign intervention that matters. In this regard, the legitimacy of Turkey’s plans for Mosul remains to be seen.

Photo credit: Hurrem Atayer, published by Bakis Kutuphanesi (1956)


(Yahoo News)


"Choose a job you love and you will not have to work a day in your life" (Confucius)

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Luis Miguel Goitizolo

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RE: ARE WE NOW IN THE END TIMES?
10/24/2016 2:44:01 PM

Long-eradicated diphtheria reappears in Venezuela; government blames the CIA


GETTY IMAGES

Diphtheria, an extremely contagious disease that has been mostly eradicated worldwide through vaccination, has reappeared in Venezuela.

So far it has killed four children.

More than 20 cases have been reported in just one month, including those four fatalities in the southern state of Bolivar.

In the crisis-stricken South American nation, many of the children don't have access to the DPT vaccine that prevents the centuries-old disease. Caused by the Corynebacterium diphtheriae bacterium, the disease becomes serious if the bacterial toxin enters the bloodstream and spreads through the respiratory tract. It leads to heart failure and neurological illnesses.

Even with treatment, death occurs in between 5 and 10 percent of those affected.

This week the sense of urgency went up a few notches when a possible case of diphtheria was reported in Caracas’ Military Hospital, considered the country’s best.

Uncertainty has become commonplace in Venezuelan epidemiology.

The reappearance of diphtheria, a disease not seen here in more than 20 years, is the worst symptom yet of the country’s broken health system.

Venezuela used to be Latin America's richest country, but it is now falling apart as a plunge in the price of oil caps off years of economic mismanagement. Local production of almost everything has stalled, and there is little money to import medicine.

Fearing government retaliation, doctors from Bolivar’s Hospital of Guaiparo Raul Leoni opted to do not reveal their identities when on Sept. 21 they reported they had four diphtheria cases, which soon turned into 23.

In the following days, two other states, Sucre and Nueva Esparta, reported a total of four cases to the Venezuelan Society of Infectious Diseases. All four patients have ties with people who had recently visited Bolivar.

When last week the Ministry of Health finally made the announcement acknowledging the resurgence of diphtheria, Diosdado Cabello, a prominent Chavista, said Venezuela is the target of a "germ warfare orchestrated by the CIA labs."

A few days earlier, Marisol Escalona, Coordinator of the government's Expanded Program on Immunization, came out with an odd warning to the medical community: "You cannot report anything (about diphtheria) because it goes against the [Bolivarian] revolution."

According to opposition lawmaker José Manuel Olivares, members of the Intelligence Agency Sebin are “chasing” doctors in Bolivar to try to keep them from speak out about the outbreak.

Olivares said he has information of at least 20 diphtheria-related deaths since April.

The shortage of antitoxins and antibiotics across the country has the potential to turn this outbreak into a national or perhaps regional crisis.

The minimum dosage of antitoxin recommended to treat diphtheria is between 20,000 and 40,000 units when symptoms are only two days old, and between 80,000 and 100,000 if the disease is present for more than three days and the patient's neck is already swollen.

In Bolivar, doctors have to work around a limited supply of 10,000-unit doses — and most of them expired in 2009.

"Venezuela is not prepared to deal with a diphtheria outbreak because we don’t meet the immunization standard recommended by the World Health Organization, because we cannot provide medication in a timely manner and because of flaws in the information flow to the community," said Huniades Urbina, president of the Venezuelan Society of Pediatrics, in a video conference at the Central University of Venezuela.

In addition, the Epidemiological Bulletin has not been published since of November 2014.

Dr. Julio Castro, from the Institute of Tropical Medicine, agrees with Urbina in that containing the outbreak requires a wide vaccination effort.

"For over 20 years we had not witnessed cases of diphtheria disease in Venezuela for a simple reason: it can be prevented by the DPT vaccine (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus),” he said. “It is possible that the government did not vaccinate the number of people necessary to create the epidemiological barrier."

According to information collected by the Health Ministry but not released to the public (Fox News Latino accessed it through the Venezuelan Society of Public Health), between January and July of 2016 Penta3 vaccination (including diphtheria) covered barely 42 percent of babies in the state of Bolivar.

The first and second booster shot was fulfilled only in 15 percent of the children, the report said.

Jose Felix Oletta, a former health minister and member of the Society, said it was puzzling that the Pan American Health Organization has not yet issued an epidemiological alert on the diphtheria outbreak in Venezuela.

The Society has issued four warnings so far this year.

"It is clear that the strategy adopted by the national health authorities began with attempting to hide the outbreak of diphtheria and now has been replaced with minimizing the magnitude of the epidemic,” the Society of Public Health said.

María Emilia Jorge M. is a freelancer journalist living in Caracas, Venezuela.

(foxnews.com)

"Choose a job you love and you will not have to work a day in your life" (Confucius)

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Luis Miguel Goitizolo

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RE: ARE WE NOW IN THE END TIMES?
10/24/2016 5:37:21 PM

HOME FRONT ISIS killers will launch attack on British streets after they are forced out of Iraq as battle for Mosul wages on

The warning comes from a top government minister


BRITAIN faces a bigger risk of attack from ISIS the more it is squeezed in Iraq and Syria, a minister has warned.

International Development minister Rory Stewart said gunmen and bombers fleeing the under attack city of Mosul may choose to wreak mayhem on our streets next.

ENTERPRISE NEWS AND PICTURES
Mohammed Emwazi, AKA ‘Jihadi John’, a British ISIS fighter who was killed in 2015


The intervention came as terror cops hunted extremists believed to be plotting another atrocity on London’s tube network.

Mr Stewart said ISIS was “very unpredictable” so the government needed “a big focus on security” at the same time as waging war on them in the region.

“And that could include attacks in Europe and the United States, and they’ve made it clear that that’s something that they are focused on.”

An Iraqi Army sniper takes aim during a skirmish near Mosul
SPLASH NEWS
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An Iraqi Army sniper takes aim during a skirmish near Mosul
A boy pauses on his bike as he passes an oil field that was set on fire by retreating ISIS fighters
GETTY IMAGES
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A boy pauses on his bike as he passes an oil field that was set on fire by retreating ISIS fighters

The warped movement has lost 40% of the territory it once held since an international coalition lead by the US started to pound its positions two years ago.

Once the besieged northern Iraq city of Mosul falls, an assault is then planned on ISIS’s HQ city in Syria, Raqqa.

Kurdish forces launch attacks on IS in Bashiqa
Iraqi children from the village of al-Khuwayn, south of Mosul
GETTY IMAGES
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Free at last... Iraqi children from the village of al-Khuwayn, south of Mosul
The fighting around Mosul could intensify in the coming days
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The fighting around Mosul could intensify in the coming days

Mr Stewart’s warning came as his boss Development Secretary Priti Patel announced £14m of urgent aid for refugees fleeing Mosul’s fighting.

The package will include shelter, vital equipment including cooking items, and medical teams to help 66,000 people.

(thesun.co.uk)

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Luis Miguel Goitizolo

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RE: ARE WE NOW IN THE END TIMES?
10/25/2016 10:42:55 AM

AMERICANS HAVE CHOICE BETWEEN 'BAD AND WORSE:' IRANIAN PRESIDENT

Hassan Rouhani says the debates prove 'there is no morality' in the United States.

BY ON 10/23/16 AT 3:05 PM


Steel, Lies And Track Records: Donald Trump And Hillary Clinton Get Rough In The 3rd Presidential Debate

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said on Sunday the choice offered to voters in the U.S. presidential election was between "bad and worse" and that harsh exchanges in the debates pointed to a lack of morality in America, Tehran's arch adversary.

"America claims it has more than 200 years of democracy, and they have had 50 presidential elections, but there is no morality in that country," Rouhani said in a speech, carried live by state television.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks at a news conference near the United Nations General Assembly in Manhattan, September 22.
LUCAS JACKSON/REUTERS

"You saw the presidential debates, how they talk...how they accuse and mock (each other)," Rouhani told a crowd gathered at a stadium during his visit to the central city of Arak.

Rouhani said a head of state had asked him during his visit to the United Nations in September about who he preferred between Republican candidate Donald Trump and his Democratic rival Hillary Clinton.

"I said should I prefer bad over worse or worse over bad?," said Rouhani, a pragmatist politician and cleric who may run for re-election in Iran's presidential polls in May 2017.

He did not say to which candidate his descriptions referred.


(Newsweek)



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Luis Miguel Goitizolo

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RE: ARE WE NOW IN THE END TIMES?
10/25/2016 10:55:27 AM
Plans to send heavier weapons to CIA-backed rebels in Syria stall amid White House skepticism



Drone footage over the Syrian city of Aleppo shows the devastating impact of over five years of war on the city and its people. (Reuters)

As rebel-held sections of Aleppo crumbled under Russian bombing this month, the Obama administration was secretly weighing plans to rush more firepower to CIA-backed units in ­Syria.

The proposal, which involved weapons that might help those forces defend themselves against Russian aircraft and artillery, made its way onto the agenda of a recent meeting President Obama held with his national security team.

And that’s as far as it got. Neither approved nor rejected, the plan was left in a state of ambiguity that U.S. officials said reflects growing administration skepticism about escalating a covert CIA program that has trained and armed thousands of Syrian fighters over the past three years.

The operation has served as the centerpiece of the U.S. strategy to press Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step aside. But U.S. officials said there are growing doubts that even an expanded version could achieve that outcome because of Moscow’s intervention. Obama, officials said, now seems inclined to leave the fate of the CIA program up to the next occupant of the White House.

If so, Obama’s successor will inherit an array of unattractive options. Critics of the proposal to increase arms shipments warn that it would only worsen the violence in Syria without fundamentally changing the outcome. But inaction has its own risks — increasing the likelihood that Aleppo will fall, that tens of thousands of CIA-backed fighters will search for more-reliable allies, and that the United States will lose leverage over regional partners that until now have refrained from delivering more-dangerous arms to Assad’s opponents.

The proposed expansion of the agency program — dubbed “Plan B” because it was seen as a fallback for failed diplomatic efforts — still has supporters, including CIA Director John Brennan and Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter. But even former ardent proponents, including Secretary of State John F. Kerry, have voiced skepticism about any escalation at this point. He and others fear that the new weaponry could end up killing Russian military personnel, triggering a confrontation with Moscow.

One senior U.S. official said that it is time for a “ruthless” look at whether agency-supported fighters can still be considered moderate, and whether the program can accomplish anything beyond adding to the carnage in Syria.

The CIA units are “not doing any better on the battlefield, they’re up against a more formidable adversary, and they’re increasingly dominated by extremists,” said the U.S. official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive operation. “What has this program become, and how will history record this effort?”

Backers of the program said that the CIA effort had succeeded in important aspects of its mission — building a politically moderate force that by last year posed a serious threat to Assad. A U.S. official said that the CIA-backed opposition — widely known as the Free Syrian Army — remains largely intact after a year of Russian pounding, and is the only force in Syria capable of prolonging the war and possibly pushing Moscow to abandon Assad as part of a political solution.

“The FSA remains the only vehicle to pursue those goals,” said a second U.S. official.

The White House and CIA declined to comment. Administration officials familiar with Obama’s thinking said all options remain on the table, though the president has made clear his reluctance to use overt military force.

“We continue to press for options that will decrease violence in Aleppo and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people,” a senior administration official said. “We and our partners will continue to provide support to the opposition and Syrian civil society in a manner that advances those objectives.”

Neither Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton nor her Republican counterpart, Donald Trump, has publicly outlined a position on the widely known but nevertheless classified CIA operation in Syria.

In their final debate, Clinton struck a more hawkish tone, reiterating her support for carving out an area in northern Syria for civilians and moderate opposition elements where Syrian and Russian planes would not be allowed to fly. “A no-fly zone can save lives and hasten the end of the conflict,” Clinton said, adding that doing so would “take a lot of negotiation. It would also take making it clear to the Russians and the Syrians that our purpose here was to provide safe zones on the ground.”

Trump did not articulate specific plans for Syria, other than to describe the war as a disaster and declare that Aleppo — a major city with the largest concentration of opposition forces — is in his view already a lost cause.

U.S. officials said predictions of Aleppo’s imminent fall should be viewed with skepticism. It is more likely, they said, that the battle for Aleppo will drag on for months. Even if it were to fall, some in the administration hope that rebels can open new fronts against the regime in other parts of the country, forcing Russia to spread its air assets more widely.

Clinton was a backer of CIA intervention in Syria when the plan was first proposed in 2012 by then-CIA Director David H. Petraeus and she was serving as secretary of state. But Russia was not directly involved in the conflict at the time, and it is unclear whether Clinton would continue to favor an aggressive agency arms program given Moscow’s powerful presence there now.

“It’s a fine mess we’ve gotten ourselves into,” said a former senior administration official who was directly involved in the early White House deliberations over the CIA program. “There’s a huge risk here since the Russians entered. . . . The lesson out of this is that if you don’t take action early on, you should almost expect the options to get worse and worse and worse.”

The former official said that Obama now had “understandable reason for caution” but dismissed the White House argument that its inaction on Plan B shouldn’t be interpreted as significant. “The lack of a decision is a decision,” the former official said.

Members of the Free Syrian Army and other U.S.-backed groups in Aleppo said they have gone long stretches without weapons deliveries but have stockpiled arms in large quantities since 2014, anticipating that the air bombardment would eventually give way to a ground assault.

Molham Ekaidi, deputy commander of an FSA unit in Aleppo, said in an online interview that the United States’ failure to deliver advanced antiaircraft weapons to aid in the defense of Aleppo amounted to a “green light” for Moscow to lay waste to the city.

U.S. intelligence officials say that the rebels have proved to be effective street fighters but that they aren’t sure how long they will be able to hold out given the extensive damage inflicted from the air. Ekaidi said street fighting would favor the rebel side.

“They won’t be able to solve Aleppo by military means,” Ekaidi said. “The regime is weak when it comes to street warfare. The air bombardment won’t be effective enough.”

Obama was always lukewarm in his enthusiasm for CIA intervention. In 2012, he commissioned a classified study of other cases of the agency backing rebel forces. In an interview with the New Yorker magazine, Obama said that he wanted examples of when “that actually worked out well. And they couldn’t come up with much.”

When the deteriorating situation in Syria prompted Obama to authorize the CIA to begin vetting, training and arming moderate factions in 2013, he imposed constraints that frustrated agency operatives. Their goal in Syria would not be to enable rebels to win and seize power, according to officials’ accounts, but to push the conflict toward a stalemate and force various factions to negotiate Syria’s future after Assad.

The CIA set up jointly run compounds in Jordan and Turkey, where officials said more than 10,000 rebels have gotten training and equipment over the past three years. Those vetted units are part of a constellation of opposition groups with 50,000 or more fighters that have gotten money and weapons from the CIA and regional partners including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey.

The terms required the partners to keep certain classes of weapons out of Syria, particularly MANPADs, highly portable surface-to-air missiles that Washington worried would fall into the hands of terrorist groups and be used to target civilian aircraft.

Rebels chafed at the restriction, complaining that it left them vulnerable to air attack by Assad and, more recently, Russia. The Plan B proposal envisioned a compromise in which the CIA and its partners would deliver truck-mounted antiaircraft weapons that could help rebel units but would be difficult for a terrorist group to conceal and use against civilian aircraft.

As the Russian pounding of Aleppo intensified, horrific images of injured children and destroyed hospitals put new pressure on Obama to authorize expanded weapons shipments to besieged opposition groups. Plan B was raised during a series of weekly White House meetings and was finally put to Obama during an Oct. 14 session with the National Security Council.

Carter has for months favored a “doubling down” of the CIA program, officials said, to inflict higher costs on Moscow for its intervention, while opposing using U.S. military force out of worry that it would divert resources from the campaign against the Islamic State.

But he and Brennan have been outnumbered by skeptics. White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough has been cautious about the operation from the outset. Kerry, a longtime supporter, has edged toward the camp of doubters, officials said, partly out of concern that any U.S. escalation at this time will only trigger an asymmetric response by Moscow.

“The Russians have seized the initiative,” said a second senior administration official involved in Syria discussions. “You can’t pretend you can go to war against Assad and not go to war against Russia.”

The CIA’s own assessments of the program have been viewed with suspicion by some at the White House, officials said. “Does it make any sense that the people who are totally invested in this program . . . are the same people who are writing analyses of the Syrian opposition on which decisions are based on the future of that program?” the first U.S. official said.

Amid the setbacks in Syria in recent months, key figures in the administration have advocated prioritizing the fight against the Islamic State, rather than against the Assad government. But agency officials disagree with this rationale, saying that the Islamic State can’t be eradicated until a new government emerges capable of controlling the terrorist group’s territory in Raqqa and elsewhere.

“You can’t defeat ISIL without removing Assad,” the second U.S. official said, using an alternative name for the Islamic State. “As long as there is a failed state in Syria, ISIL will have a homeland.”

Obama’s reluctance has frustrated the CIA’s partners overseas who were expecting Plan B to be approved. U.S. officials said the ban on the most worrisome weapons remains intact. Key partners such as Turkey, with busy airports and a long border with Syria, are equally determined to keep MANPADs and other munitions out of extremists’ hands.

Still, a senior Turkish official said his government feels misled about U.S. intentions and would likely begin exploring unilateral arrangements to provide heavier arms to Turkey-backed groups.

“They promised to give more support,” the Turkish official said. “But it now seems like nothing is going to happen. This coalition hasn’t delivered. It’s obsolete now. So we’re going to look at our options. If Aleppo falls, Assad wins.”

Greg Jaffe contributed to this report.


(The Washington Post)


"Choose a job you love and you will not have to work a day in your life" (Confucius)

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